On Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the World at 75 years by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (in Spanish)

Hiroshima y Nagasaki

Y el mundo a 75 años

El avión sobrevoló la ciudad de Hiroshima, los pilotos a cumplir su rutina  de  guerra, arrojar las bombas sobre territorio enemigo y regresar a la base. Ese día las instrucciones de sus jefes fue que llevaban un arma especial,   arrojar la bomba en el objetivo asignado y alejarse lo más rápido posible del blanco. El día 6 de agosto el cielo  estaba sin nubosidad y el comandante feliz  porque habían puesto el nombre de su madre Enola Gay al avión.

 Cuando arrojaron la bomba atómica sobre la ciudad de Hiroshima algo se quebró en su interior y el piloto gritó -¡Dios mío,… Dios mío… que hemos hecho!…..en ese minuto el mundo cambió. El presidente Truman de los EEUU dio la orden de arrojar la bomba sobre Hiroshima, una ciudad civil sin bases militares,  la bomba atómica  desato  el horror, la destrucción y muerte se sobre  la  humanidad.

Los pilotos regresaron con la muerte en el alma, ya nada sería igual. El gobierno de Truman buscó todo tipo de justificación para justificar lo injustificable,  Japón ya estaba vencido antes de las bombas. La crueldad humana no tiene límites, como no la tuvo el nazismo en los campos de concentración  contra los judíos.

El presidente Truman  impartió la orden de  arrojar la segunda bomba atómica el día 9 de agosto de 1945 sobre la ciudad de Nagasaki.  El “éxito de las masacres” fue total, necesitaba  mostrar el poderío de los EEUU al mundo y en especial a la Unión Soviética, su aliado circunstancial en la guerra.

Una madre víctima de la bomba en Nagasaki deja una carta a su hija de dos años que sobrevive, es de una ternura infinita  donde le dice como cambió la vida, que su amor permanece más allá de la muerte y  que la recuerde.

En mis viajes a Japón en varias oportunidades estuve en  Hiroshima, me reuní con  mujeres – Ibakushas,-  sobrevivientes de la bomba;  son  testigos del horror y nos  acompañaron  recorriendo los túmulos y lugares dónde estallo la bomba y donde se encuentran  las víctimas; decían que  tienen la responsabilidad de trasmitir la memoria  de lo vivido cuando eran niñas a tres kilómetros de la ciudad en la escuela y ese día perdieron su familia, después de los bombardeos hasta el presente sufren las radiaciones, el cáncer y la contaminación que mató a miles de japoneses/as  no combatientes.

La humanidad frente al dolor y tragedia  de dos guerras en el siglo XX  buscó encontrar caminos de entendimiento y respeto entre los pueblos y dio nacimiento a  las Naciones Unidas y la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, un paso fundamental en para lograr superar el horror  y sanar las heridas y tratar de encontrar nuevos horizontes de vida  para que nunca más vuelva a desatarse  la tragedia de todas las guerras. Si bien los organismos internacionales cumplen una función necesaria  en el mundo, la carrera armamentista, las guerras, los conflictos bélicos, de alta y baja intensidad, y la explotación de los bienes y recursos de la Madre Tierra  no terminaron. Continúa la ambición del poder dominación acumulando arsenales nucleares entre las grandes potencias y generando más pobreza, marginalidad y hambre en el mundo

 Hoy nuestra Casa Común sufre la Pandemia del Coronavirus,  tragedia que  afecta a toda la humanidad con miles de muertos y millones de infestados y sin encontrar hasta el momento vacunas o antídotos para superar la tragedia global.

El Covid 19 es consecuencia del maltrato del ser humano contra la Madre Tierra, la destrucción de la floresta, los agro-tóxicos, las quemas intencionales que provocan la perdida de la biodiversidad,  la muerte de los animales y la violencia contra las comunidades indígenas;  devastación y crueldad que ha roto el equilibrio entre el ser humano y la Madre Tierra, es urgente llamar a la conciencia de los gobiernos que privilegian el capital financiero sobre la vida de los pueblos.

Llamar a la conciencia de  empresas que en su afán de lucro no respetan los derechos de la Naturaleza, es urgente convocar a un “Nuevo contrato Social”  para encontrar nuevos caminos de convivencia, caso contrario las pandemias se agudizarán cobrando más vidas y la destrucción de  bienes y recursos naturales.

Los centros de investigación científica están cerca de alcanzar una vacuna para el Covid 19, es necesario que la misma sea gratuita para toda la humanidad, sin exclusiones de los países más pobres.

Es necesario hacer memoria, no para quedarse en el pasado, la memoria nos ilumina el presente y nos llama a reflexionar, a 75 años de Hiroshima tenemos que ver el caminar de la humanidad,  sus avances y retrocesos, no se trata de recordar únicamente la tragedia y a las víctimas, debemos honrar la memoria de las víctimas de las guerras y mirar el camino a recorrer de la humanidad.

No olvidar  el momento que el mundo cambia cuando el avión por orden del presidente de los EEUU Truman lanza su carga mortífera sobre poblaciones civiles.

El pueblo japonés sobreponiéndose al dolor y destrucción ha logrado grandes avances en la reconstrucción de ciudades devastadas como Hiroshima y Nagasaki, pero preserva la memoria de los días  6 y 9 de agosto de 1945 en que el mundo cambio.

 La humanidad necesita desarmar la “razón armada”, hacer  realidad lo que en el Foro Social Mundial – FSM- proclamamos que “Otro mundo es posible”, transformar las armas en arados  como  dice el profeta Isaias,  a fin de alcanzar la Paz y unidad en la diversidad entre las personas y los pueblos del mundo.

Adolfo Pérez Esquivel

Buenos Aires, 1 de agosto del 2020

 

Paralysis at the WTO: Is the MPIA the Answer?

Paralysis at the WTO

The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on April 30th, 2020, was developed by twenty (20) WTO members to overcome the current paralysis of the WTO’s dispute settlement process. Resolving trade disputes that arise between its members is a core WTO function and considered a central component of the multilateral trading system. Its dispute settlement process is the mechanism by which WTO members seek peaceful enforcement of the rules to which they have agreed and the concessions they have negotiated with each other. As provided for in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), disputants are required to first undergo consultations and attempt to resolve the issues(s) at this phase. About one-third of the cases move on to the adjudicative phase where an ad hoc Panel of experts (usually three) hears and makes a determination on the case. The losing party has the right of appeal to the WTO Appellate Body, constituted as a permanent body of seven members whose role is to review the legal aspects of the Panel Report under appeal. Panel and Appellate Body Reports are adopted by the entire WTO membership and are binding on the parties to the dispute. Since 2017, the United States has blocked the appointment of new members to the Appellate Body to replace those whose terms have expired. Consequently, the Appellate Body no longer has the required minimum of three members needed to hear appeals, resulting in the current state of paralysis.

What is the MPIA?

The signatories to the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) have committed to use the arbitration procedures provided for under Article 25 of the DSU as an interim appeal procedure while the Appellate Body is unable to fulfill its functions because of the current crisis. MPIA signatories envisage that: (i) their appeals will be heard by three (3) arbitrators chosen from a pool of ten (10) standing arbitrators selected by the participating Members; and (ii) the appeal arbitration procedures will be based on the substantive and procedural aspects of Appellate Review laid out in Article 17 of the DSU. These procedures are also laid out in Annex 1 to the MPIA. Furthermore, Article 25 of the DSU on the use of arbitration requires that the parties to the proceeding also abide by specified requirements for all cases, notably: (i) compliance with timeframes; (ii) notification of the decision to the WTO where any Member may raise any relevant point it wishes; (iii) acceptance of and prompt compliance with the arbitral award; and (iv) the use of the remedies of compensation and suspension of concessions. This last requirement underscores the importance of the WTO dispute settlement process in limiting retaliation against a non-compliant member to peaceful methods. Unlike Panel and Appellate Body Reports, however, the arbitral awards will not be adopted by WTO Members. Finally, the MPIA provides that any WTO Member may join or withdraw from the MPIA, with proper notification.

To date, only two additional countries have joined the MPIA since its introduction. At the same time, no other solutions to the paralysis have been adopted by WTO Members. The proposals outlined in October, 2019, by New Zealand’s Ambassador to the WTO, David Walker (dubbed “The Walker Process”) have won broad support. However, the WTO consensus approach to decision-making means that a decision is taken only if no Member formally objects. The United States has voiced its opposition to the proposals, stating that they do not go far enough in addressing its concerns. Instead, the United States has opted to appeal a Panel Report in a dispute with India. With no Appellate Body to review the decision, the Panel Report has not been adopted by the WTO. The case remains in a void and does not have to be implemented. The MPIA provides a workable alternative to avoid this abuse of the system.

Can the MPIA “Save” the WTO?

The MPIA cannot “save” the WTO. Nor is it intended to do so. The MPIA was designed with a very limited goal in mind – to permit its signatories to continue to properly appeal Panel Reports in cases amongst themselves so long as the crisis continues. It presents a pragmatic and interim solution to a problem they hope will be short-lived. It also still has limited reach given that only 22 of the WTO’s 164 members have so far joined. Other countries are being lobbied to join and perhaps may eventually do so as concerns about its operations get addressed.

More fundamentally, the paralysis at the WTO results from core divisions and disagreement among the Members on a range of issues. The United States has consistently expressed concern about the work of the Appellate Body, which it has accused of judicial overreach – of inserting into WTO Agreements provisions that were never envisaged by the negotiators. The current US position appears to be that the Appellate Body is not essential to the work of the WTO. Meanwhile, developing country Members were sold on the WTO precisely because of the power given to the Appellate Body to review the decisions from the Panel phase where power disparities can more readily play out.

This issue is only one of several that have created a deep divide between developing country and developed country members of the WTO. The Doha Development Round, intended to address the development concerns of developing countries in such areas as agriculture, and intellectual property, has essentially been abandoned. Developed countries claim their obligations were met with negotiation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement of 2013 and that it is time to focus energies on negotiating new agreements on the digital economy and services. Under the weight of these divisions, the consensus approach to decision-making has broken down and the WTO has been able to conclude Plurilateral Agreements that apply only to the subset of WTO Members, primarily developed countries, who can agree on a given way forward on an issue.

The MPIA represents yet another Plurilateral Agreement that highlights the broader challenges within the organization. Consequently, it provides a temporary solution for some Members, but not an answer to the paralysis at the WTO.

Book Launch: Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power (Jennifer Trahan)

Please join us for this exciting book launch next week!
BOOK LAUNCH EVENT:  Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes (Cambridge University Press 2020), co-sponsored by the American Society of International Law International Criminal Law Interest Group and the American Branch of the International Law Association United Nations Committee
Join leading experts in the field discuss Professor Jennifer Trahan’s new book which examines the legality of the use by a permanent member of the UN Security Council of its veto while there is ongoing genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
Thursday, July 23, 12:00 p.m. – 1:30 p.m. EST (zoom link below)
Panelists:
Jennifer Trahan, Clinical Professor and Director of the Concentration in International Law and Human Rights, NYU, Center for Global Affairs
Richard Goldstone, founding Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Beth Van Schaack, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor of Human Rights, Stanford Law School
Michael Scharf, Co-Dean and Joseph C. Hostetler – BakerHostetler Professor Of Law, Case Western Reserve School of Law
Moderator:  Milena Sterio, Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Cafee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law; Director, Domestic and International LL.M. Program, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
Topic: Professor Jennifer Trahan Book Launch
Time: Jul 23, 2020 12:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)
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PART I: INDIA’S POLICY CHANGES TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In the present climate of xenophobic impulses and right-wing nationalism, coupled with escalating allegations of terrorism and state security, establishing host state’s obligations to protect refugees is a painstaking challenge. It is generally claimed that non-refoulement (ban on forcing refugees to return to countries where they are likely to face persecution) has achieved the status of customary international law. Nevertheless, states often find justifications to defy its implementation. Refugees are commonly portrayed as a threat to the security of the host country, and this justification is suitably invoked to close their borders or deporting refugees to their country of origin. Further, there is a growing tendency to label them as ‘economic migrants’/‘illegal immigrants’. These restrictive policies have facilitated the erosion of non-refoulement in a functional sense.

There have been consistent efforts by states at implementing non-entrée policies to stop refugees (particularly those who do not possess political and ideological value) from reaching their international border. There are differential policies for different sects of people, which conveniently facilitate states in choosing the kind of others they prefer to welcome. These policies have taken the shape of a civilizing mission where the central idea is to ‘exclude’ the ‘un-civilized’ on the grounds of the state’s interest. It is pursued with the goal of securing electoral gains, demonstrating cultural superiority or establishing brute majoritarianism.

The rampant oppressive practice of the Indian government towards refugees is a textbook instance. India not being a signatory to the Refugee Convention and, in the absence of any defined statutory framework on refugees, has only ad-hoc mechanisms in place for refugees. As per the Foreigners Act, 1946, every foreigner, unless exempted, should be in possession of a valid passport or visa to enter India. Hence, if a refugee contravenes these provisions, she is likely to be indicted just like any other foreigner. Inconsistencies and arbitrariness rule in the absence of any clearly defined statutory standards. Thus, while we witness a generous behaviour being meted out to some categories of refugees, others are alleged to be ‘economic migrants’/‘illegal migrants’ and consequently detained, penalized and deported.

The recently-conducted process in Assam (a state in northeastern India) to update the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is a manifestation of India’s intensifying tyrannical inclinations. Historically, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, due to the development of railways, tea, and coal and oil industries, colonial Assam witnessed heavy migration from other provinces of British India. The colonial authorities also encouraged educated Bengalis to take up jobs as teachers and other such professions in Assam. These movements resulted in a change in the demographic profile of Assam.

Further, the Partition of India in 1947 and ensuing communal riots on the subcontinent gave rise to the influx of refugees from East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) in Assam chiefly due to its geographical proximity. Similarly, in 1971, during the Bangladesh Liberation War, Assam witnessed heavy migration from Bangladesh. Ever since, Assam has been experiencing a continuous migration flow from Bangladesh for various reasons, including climate change. Serious objections against this migration trend have been mounting in the ‘indigenous’ Assamese community. Allegations of depleting natural resources, increasing violence, marginalization and threat to their ‘Assamese identity’ began to amplify in the late ’70s, which gradually led to the Assam Agitation (1979-1985). The Movement, many claims, was triggered after the death of Hiralal Patwari, sitting Member of Parliament from Lok Sabha (House of the People) representing the Mangaldai (Assam) Constituency, which necessitated holding of by-elections. During the process of the election an abrupt and dramatic increase was witnessed in the number of registered voters and it was alleged that a large number of these voters were illegal settlers from Bangladesh.

To many Assamese it appeared as if the Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims together were now in a position to undermine Assamese rule. It was feared that the census would show a sharp decline in the number of Assamese speakers as Bengalis who had previously declared their language Assamese would now officially revert to Bengali. (Weiner 1983)

On the other hand, it was claimed that the movement involved careful planning by a few in order to retain the Assamese Hindu majority in the state assembly election, so that other communities, specially Muslims, could not reduce the Assamese Hindus to minority in the elections.

The movement further witnessed the horrific Nelli Massacre of 1983 which allegedly claimed the lives of almost 3000 Muslims in Assam. Two years after the massacre in 1985, the Assam Accord was signed which fixed 24 March 1971 as the cut-off date (as the Bangladesh Liberation War began on 25 March 1971). The Accord envisaged that all foreign nationals who entered Assam ‘illegally’ on or after 25th March 1971 were to be detected, their names deleted from the electoral rolls and subsequently deported under the Foreigners Act, 1946. Section 2(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act of 1955 defines an “illegal migrant” as a foreigner who entered India, (a) without a valid passport or prescribed travel documents or, (b) with a valid passport or other prescribed travel documents but remained in India beyond the permitted period of time.

State Sponsored Persecution of Uighur Muslims in China

It is a well known fact that the People’s Republic of China is infamous for carrying out human rights violations on a large scale. Right now, an organized state sponsored reign of terror is being perpetuated by the authoritarian regime against the Uighur Muslims  of the country. The Uighur Muslims are an ethic Turkish minority group residing in the northwestern region of Xinjiang province of China. This region is known as Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 

Ever since Chen Quanguo , the Chinese Communist party secretary, has been given the charge of XUAR, the crimes against the Uighur Muslims have considerably increased through their illegal detention in internment camps. Though there is little information about the treatment of detained Uighur Muslims in these camps, some credible sources have reported that detainees are forced to live in prison like conditions in these camps and are subjected to torture on a regular basis. Apart from these, the Uighur Muslims are also subjected to state surveillance so as to ensure that they are prevented from practicing Islam in any form or manner. Furthermore, the Chinese government has also adopted the policy of harvesting human organs from the Uighur Muslim community. 

Beijing has often responded to accusations about illegally detaining Uighur Muslims by terming the detention or internment camps as ‘re-education centres’ for the betterment of the Uighur Muslim Community. However, this is a poor attempt on Beijing’s part to thwart any criticism by the international community.

China’s Violation of International Law

The mass detention of Uighur Muslims, prevalence of torture against detainees, lack of information about the whereabouts of the detainees and the harvesting of their organs constitute crimes against humanity. Article 7 of the Rome statute of the International Criminal court lays down the criteria as to what specifically constitutes Crimes against Humanity and that criterion is being fulfilled by the Chinese government. Crimes against humanity take place when civilians are subjected to continuous human rights violations which are ignored or perpetuated by the governing authorities. According to Article 7(2) (a) of the Rome statute , crimes against humanity are committed in accordance with the state’s formal policy as in the case of China.  Additionally, according to the Rome statute, persecution of a community on the basis of religious or cultural ground also constitutes a crime against humanity.

Application of Human Rights Law

There are four major conventions on human rights and China is a party to all four of them. These are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , the International Covenant on Economic, social and Cultural Rights , Convention against cruel and other, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Through the unjustified mass detention of the Uighur Muslims, China has been flouting the above mentioned conventions and has drawn widespread criticism from around the world. 

Crimes against Uighur Women 

China is also a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. It is arguably the most widely violated convention by China when it comes to Uighur Muslims. Reports have emerged that Uighur Women are subjected to rape, medical experiments, forced sterilization and their menstrual cycles are often disrupted so as to prevent them from procreating. Apart from that, China is also implementing a ‘ Pair Up and Become a Family’ program under which Uighur women are forced to live in the same household as communist party officials so as to acquaint them with the ethnic Han Chinese culture. All these are indicative of the fact that China has been violating the CEDAW. 

Conclusion

Under the garb of combating religious extremism, China has adopted policies against the Uighur Muslim Community which have resulted in the creating of genocide like situation in the Xinjiang province. The cultural genocide that is being committed by China deserves much more attention from the world. Owing to the country’s global influence, it hasn’t received the kind of backlash that it deserves from the world community.

ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Chagos Archipelago Case: Self-Determination Re-Examined?

On February 25, 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.  The advisory opinion had been requested of the court through a General Assembly resolution in 2017, on the following legal question:

(a) Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?;
(b) What are the consequences under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?

ICJ answered the first question in the negative, and concluded that the decolonization process of Mauritius had not been lawfully completed at the time of Mauritian independence.  And the court held, on the second question, that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to bring to end its administration of the islands as rapidly as possible.  This post will provide a brief factual background regarding the Chagos Archipelago, as well as a succinct legal analysis of the world court’s reasoning and ultimate conclusions.

Where is the Chagos Archipelago and what was its relationship to the United Kingdom and Mauritius prior to Mauritian independence in 1968? Between 1814 and 1965, the Chagos Archipelago was administered by the United Kingdom as a dependency of the colony of Mauritius.  In 1964, during a time when the  United Kingdom was contemplating decolonizing Mauritius, the United States expressed an interest (to the United Kingdom) in establishing a military base on one of Chagossian islands, Diego Garcia.  In 1965, the United Kingdom concluded the co-called Lancaster Agreement with the representatives of the colony of Mauritius.  Through the Lancaster Agreement, the U.K. and Mauritius “agreed in principle to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from the territory of Mauritius. This agreement in principle was given on condition that the archipelago could not be ceded to any third party and would be returned to Mauritius at a later date, a condition which was accepted at the time by the United Kingdom.” (para. 171).  After this Agreement, the United Kingdom detached the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius.  In 1965, the United Kingdom also concluded an agreement with the United States, allowing the latter to build a military base on Diego Garcia.  By 1971, all of the inhabitants of Diego Garcia were forced to relocate from the island by the United Kingdom authorities and the United States proceeded to build a military base on the island.  Mauritius (without Chagos Islands) obtained independence from the United Kingdom in 1968; according to a former Mauritian Prime Minister, Mauritius had no choice but to agree to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago prior to independence.  As of today, the United States still operates a military base in Diego Garcia (the U.S. – U.K. agreement of 1965, allowing the U.S. to operate a military base in Diego Garcia, has been extended).  The Chagossians have been dispersed, since the early 1970s, in Mauritius, the Seychelles, and the United Kingdom.  By virtue of U.K. law, they have not been allowed to return to the Chagos Archipelago.

How did the ICJ reason in this advisory opinion, and how did it reach its ultimate conclusions? First, the ICJ held that it had jurisdiction over the dispute because the request from the General Assembly for this advisory opinion constituted a “legal question” pursuant to article 65 of the court’s statute (para. 58).  Second, the ICJ held that, in its discretion, it should not decline to exercise jurisdiction over this case.  The court reasoned that it had enough factual information to answer the legal questions asked (paras. 69-74), that it was not for the court to decline jurisdiction based on the argument that the court’s opinion would not assist the General Assembly, as this is for the General Assembly itself to decide (paras.  75-78), and that it was not precluded through the principles of res judicata from rendering this advisory opinion (because the U.K. and Mauritius had arbitrated a slightly different dispute before an arbitral tribunal, and because the U.K. and Mauritius are not the same parties in the present request for an advisory opinion) (paras.  79-80).  Moreover, the ICJ rejected the argument that it should decline jurisdiction because the request for an advisory opinion would force the court to settle a territorial dispute between two states, the U.K. and Mauritius, which had not both consented to the court’s jurisdiction over this dispute (paras. 83-91).  Instead, the ICJ held that “the purpose of the request is for the General Assembly to receive the Court’s assistance so that it may be guided in the discharge of its functions relating to the decolonization of Mauritius.” (para.  86).

After answering the jurisdictional challenges, the ICJ turned to the merits.  The court examined the right to self-determination under customary law, and whether this right existed under customary law in the late 1960s, at the time that the U.K. decolonized Mauritius.  According to the ICJ, General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 “represents a defining moment in the consolidation of State practice on decolonization” (para. 150) and “[t]he wording used in resolution 1514 (XV) has a normative character, in so far as it affirms that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination.'” (para. 153).  Moreover, according to the court, “[b]oth State practice and opinio juris at the relevant time confirm the customary law character of the right to territorial integrity of a non-self-governing territory as a corollary of the right to self-determination.” (para. 160).  Thus, the ICJ concluded that the right of self-determination was a part of customary law in 1968, at the time of Mauritian independence.  Next, the court concluded that the people of Mauritius, through the Lancaster Agreement of 1965, did not freely consent to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago (para. 172), and that the decolonization of Mauritius was thus not lawfully completed, as it did not respect the relevant principles of self-determination.  In light of this conclusion, the court found that “the United Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago constitutes a wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of that State” (para. 177) and that “the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring an end to its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, thereby enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination” (para. 178).  Moreover, the ICJ concluded that because “respect for the right to self-determination is an obligation erga omnes, all States have a legal interest in protecting that right” and “while it is for the General Assembly to pronounce on the modalities required to ensure the completion of the decolonization of Mauritius, all Member States must co-operate with the United Nations to put those modalities into effect” (para. 180).

Why did the court (likely) decide the way it did, and what does this all mean? First, it is important to note that the court’s decision was virtually unanimous: the judges unanimously determined that the court had jurisdiction; by twelve votes to two, the judges decided to comply with the request to render the advisory opinion (Judges Tomka and Donoghue against); by thirteen votes to one, the judges reached their substantive conclusions (Judge Donoghue against).  Second, as Marko Milanovic has argued, the outcome of this case may demonstrate how important the framing of the legal question is (“by avoiding the use of the term ‘sovereignty’, Mauritius and the GA defused the likelihood of the Court dismissing the case as involving a bilateral dispute”).  This may explain, in part, why the ICJ judges ultimately reached the conclusions above – that the narrow and clever wording of the advisory opinion request allowed the ICJ to reach particular legal conclusions without having to address issues of U.K. and/or Mauritian sovereignty.  Third, I agree with Marko Milanovic that the ICJ’s discussion of the most fundamental and difficult issue – whether the right of self-determination was part of customary law in 1968, at the time of Mauritian decolonization – was too brief, too rushed, and insufficiently developed in terms of legal analysis.  Fourth, the ICJ did not explain how the people of Mauritius could have freely exercised their right to self-determination (when they consented to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago): was the U.K. at an obligation to conduct a popular referendum in Mauritius on this issue, or were there other modalities of self-determination available in 1968? Fifth, it is clear that this outcome is a big loss for the U.K., as the ICJ most clearly stated that the Mauritian decolonization was not lawfully completed and that the U.K. was under an obligation to end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago immediately. Sixth, it may be argued that the outcome of this case is a loss for other countries, such as the U.S., as the ICJ concluded that all states were under an obligation to co-operate with the United Nations to ensure the completion of the decolonization of Mauritius (does this mean that the U.S. is now under an obligation to dismantle its military base on Diego Garcia?) Seventh, it may also be argued that the ICJ missed another opportunity to pronounce itself on the contours of the right of self-determination, like in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.  The legal question in this advisory opinion concerned the right to self-determination directly; instead of quickly concluding that the right was part of customary law in 1968, the court could have included a more detailed legal analysis of the content and modalities of the right of self-determination under customary law.

It remains to be seen how the U.K. (or the U.S.) will react to this advisory opinion, whether the U.S. will be willing to negotiate the relocation of its military base in Diego Garcia, and whether the people of the Chagos Arhipelago may be allowed to return to their home land.

 

Born into Statelessness: Unintended Consequences of the End of Birthright Citizenship

In October 2018, in response to growing Central and South American migrant population fleeing violence and approaching the United States, President Trump made a drastic statement that he would seek to end jus soli, or birthright citizenship, through an Executive Order. Lindsey Graham, a Republican Senator from South Carolina, lauded the President’s statement, and indicated that he intended to introduce legislation to the same effect. If successful, this new citizenship law could have a devastating impact on children born in the United States to Central and South American individuals, leaving thousands of them stateless.

As a matter of international law, states are free to determine who is or is not a national of their country without interference from the international community or international law, except in the case of stateless persons. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the two primary international instruments guiding the rights of individuals and the actions of states with regard to nationality. Many international instruments affirm the right an individual has to nationality. Specifically, the 1954 Convention defines a stateless person as someone “who is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law.” The 1961 Convention requires that states grant nationality to those born on their territory who otherwise would be stateless, and prohibits states from withdrawing nationality from an individual when that individual would then be rendered stateless. Accordingly, under international law, the United States government is free to end, or further restrict, birthright citizenship but only in accordance with the provisions in the 1961 Convention.

Issues arise in practice when the domestic laws of nations conflict, leaving individuals in situations of de facto statelessness. According to the Pew Research Center, about 250,000 children were born in the United States to non-citizen immigrant parents in 2014, with many born to parents who lacked legal status. Because of the domestic laws of the countries from which these immigrants originate, children born to immigrant parents in the United States may lack citizenship of their state of origin. They would therefore be rendered stateless if the United States were to curtail birthright citizenship, in contravention of the 1961 Convention.

For example, the law of Brazil stipulates that individuals born abroad to a Brazilian parent are eligible to acquire citizenship after becoming an adult only if their parent registered their birth with the Brazilian authorities or if they returned to live in Brazil as a child. If the individual is not registered or does not reside in Brazil before the age of majority, he or she is not entitled to Brazilian citizenship, regardless of the nationality of his or her parents. As of 2014, there were approximately 336,000 Brazilian immigrants in the United States.

There are several issues with these requirements of affirmative action on the part of the parents or child. First, to register a child with the authorities of their own birth country, parents must first demonstrate their own citizenship, which may prove problematic. Parents could do this by showing a passport, birth certificate, or identity card. However, these individuals may have fled their homes quickly without such documents, and would therefore risk being unable to register their children even if they desired to do so.

Second, even if the child of Brazilian parents wished to acquire Brazilian citizenship, the decision is entirely in the hands of his or her parents. His or her parents must be the ones to register the child’s birth with the relevant authorities; no other adult is eligible to do this and the child himself cannot make himself known to authorities later in order to qualify for citizenship. If this is not done, the child must return to reside Brazil before the age of majority. For most children, this is a decision entirely out of their control.

Therefore, should the U.S. end birthright citizenship, children born in the U.S. of Brazilian parents would be at risk of de facto statelessness by no fault of their own. This example is meant to be illustrative, though not exhaustive. Many groups of immigrants in the United States would be forced into similarly precarious positions. The domestic laws of many Central and South American countries require parents located out of the country to register their children’s births with the national authorities in order for them to be eligible for citizenship. There are many reasons why parents fleeing violence, persecution, and economic crises may not wish to register the birth of their children. Whatever the reason, innocent children without a choice would suffer as a result of this change of law. Without careful consideration of the potential impact of this change to US birthright law, many children residing in the United States would be rendered de facto stateless and vulnerable as a result.  

Calculus: Deal Doggedness and Human Rights Diplomacy

As the issue of denuclearization in the interest of global peace and security continues to be of pressing concern to the world, there is a growing tendency to prioritize such matters of international import above concerns around the problematic human rights records in countries like Iran and North Korea. However, concerns regarding the human rights situation within a country’s borders should not be relegated to the backburner while negotiating deals regarding international peace and security owing to two broad, interconnected reasons.

First, egregious violations of human rights within national borders – by their very nature – cut across these national borders and thus merit international anxiety. In particular, repressive regimes foster instability, dissatisfaction, violent conflict, and frequently, radicalization. While it is tempting to call for an emphasis on America’s “softer” side in response to human rights concerns beyond American borders, it may be prudent to acknowledge instead that the way a country treats its people can be of consequence to polities the world over. Accordingly, if Azadeh Moaveni’s conclusion that any substantial improvement in Iran’s human rights situation demands larger, structural reforms from within is accurate, any gains consolidated by finalizing deals such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action are necessarily of limited value for international peace and security. In fact, regimes that mete out systematic repression to their own people, such as Iran and North Korea, are “inherently destabilizing”; their volatile internal dynamics, posited against the background of nuclearization, present huge risks to international security, which merit due investigation, analysis and response. In such a scenario, allowing horrific internal conditions to play second fiddle while negotiating sweeping arrangements for global peace is to miss the forest for the trees.

Secondly and more specifically, acknowledging that both these concerns are relevant to the all-pervasive ‘international security’ problem could also be helpful in selling negotiations and engagement with an adversary state such as Iran to domestic constituencies. By emphasizing its potential to raise Iran’s profile in the world order and bring economic relief within Iranian borders, President Rouhani, for instance, garnered some measure of domestic support for a deal which – on the face of it – seemed like a massive concession of sovereignty. In an increasingly polarized international order, where domestic forces operating within one of the negotiating parties may view the very act of approaching the negotiating table as an admission of weakness, acknowledging that there are costs to peace and security on both sides of the coin may be a wiser move.

Syria and Domestic Prosecutions: Upholding hope, one case at a time (Part 2 of 2)

National Prosecutions based on Universal Jurisdiction: the cases of Germany, Sweden, and “France”

Last June, Germany’s chief prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant for Jamil Hassan, head of Syria’s powerful Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and one of Syria’s most senior military officials. This move comes as a 2017 Human Rights Watch report mentioned [p.36] that, so far, very few members of the Assad government had been the subject of judicial proceedings in Europe based on universal jurisdiction.

At the time these charges (based on command responsibility) were filed with Germany’s Federal Court of Justice, Patrick Kroker (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, hereinafter “ECCHR”) commented that this moment was“historical”, adding: “That this arrest warrant has been signed off by the highest criminal court in Germany shows that they deem the evidence presented to the prosecutor is strong enough to merit urgent suspicion of his involvement.”

N.N., a Syrian activist present at the side-event held today mentioned in Part 1 of my post, underlined several times the importance of these arrest warrants. Until their issuance, he said, many Syrians never would have thought that high-level representatives of the Syrian regime would have charges laid against them. For many this is a great sign of hope, a demonstration that we are “not only listening to stories but also doing something about it.” He mentioned this point in part as an answer to a participant at the event who wondered what it could mean to the people still in Syria to see prosecutions happening in Europe, but not in Syria or before the ICC.

Mr. Patrick Kroker, Legal Advisor& Project Lead for Syria at the ECCHR (Berlin) explained the work done by his organization to initiate prosecutions in Germany linked to the Syrian conflict. With regard to Germany, the progress over the past few years has been spectacular: 11 cases have been brought to trial. As well, three were brought to trial in Sweden, one in Switzerland, and another in Austria (for an excellent overview of proceedings linked to Syria, see the Amnesty International page “Justice for Syria” here).

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Syria and Domestic Prosecutions: Upholding hope, one case at a time (Part 1 of 2)

Credit: Lynsey Addario

As of July 2018, more than 500 000 people had been killed as a result of the conflict in Syria, according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. With the UN Special Envoy for Syria having recently resigned, signs of hope seem dire for many Syrians and their supporters, there and abroad.

A side-event held today, on Day 3 of the 17th Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the International Criminal Court, brought distinguished panelists together to discuss the role of prosecutions held in Europe through universal jurisdiction for international crimes, using Syria as an example. More than only about accountability, the resounding message about these prosecutions was that their role was to give out and to inspire the people to be strong, fight for justice and, maybe, eventually, be able to move on.

Earlier this week, during a keynote address at a reception held before the launch of the ASP, Ms.Catherine Marchi-Uhel aptly said that the ICC is the center piece of the international justice system. However, she also reminded the audience that the role of the international jurisdiction as a springboard for national prosecutions is often overlooked.

Yet, despite the hopes, symbolism and assistance to the rebuilding of judicial institutions that national prosecutions can bring (as I mentioned in my previous blog post on Quid Justitiae in the context of the present ASP), the political context may simply not allow it and, in the case of Syria, there is obviously no need to elaborate on why prosecutions at the national level are not possible.

In the case of Syria, one of the worst situations since World War II, as Ms Marchi-Uhel underlined, the pathway to the ICC is blocked, as a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution to refer the case to the ICC was vetoed in 2014. With the ICC option gridlocked, Marchi-Uhel said that the international community needed to be creative to find new strategies to supplement the Rome Statue system: there was a need to think outside the international justice box. This is why, in 2016, the UNGA decided to create the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM) to collect and analyse evidence of international crimes committed in Syria (see the IIIM official website here). Not a court or tribunal, it is “a building block for comprehensive justice” and can “turn limitations into opportunities”. This was definitely a smart move, as the call for Syria to be referred to the International Criminal Court by the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres did not seem to have resonated any more than previous attempts made through the UNSC.

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