International Family Law

Golan v. Saada: One Year Later

/ Melissa Kucinski / Leave a comment

On June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in its fifth Hague Abduction Convention case, Golan v. Saada.  The case addressed a heavily litigated point of law under this Convention: whether a court must consider ameliorative measures to safely return an abducted child despite the Respondent Parent successfully proving that such a return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm in the habitual residence.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with neither party, instead aligning with the position of the U.S. government, concluding that a court cannot be required to consider ameliorative measures, but may do so, in an exercise of discretion.  In issuing its opinion, Justice Sotomayor gave some guidance to lower courts in how to approach these cases going forward.  First, while the judge has no obligation to consider these ameliorative measures, “it ordinarily should address ameliorative measures raised by the parties or obviously suggested by the circumstances of the case, such as in the example of a localized epidemic.”  Second, if the judge does consider ameliorative measures, that judge “must prioritize the child’s physical and psychological safety”, “should abide by the Convention’s requirement that courts addressing return petitions do not usurp the role of the court that will adjudicate the underlying custody dispute”, and “must accord with the Convention’s requirement that courts ‘act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.’” When ameliorative measures are at issue in a case, they could range from a parent voluntarily undertaking certain obligations upon the child’s return (such as refraining from contact, paying support, or providing resources), to existing resources in the home country (such as “access to legal services, financial assistance, housing assistance, health services, shelters and other forms of assistance or support to victims of domestic violence, as well as responses by police and through the criminal justice system.”) See the Hague Conference’s Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(b), para. 43, et. seq.

Now, one year on from the Supreme Court’s opinion, litigants are settling in to the new standard. Just over one month after the Golan v. Saada opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the new standard in Braude v. Zeirler.  The Respondent Mother argued, and the court found, the exception of a grave risk based on the Petitioner Father’s “untreated mental health issues, history of domestic violence and coercive conduct, and access and possession of child pornography …”. The Petitioner Father argued that he consented to eight separate ameliorative measures, ranging from no contact with the Respondent, to therapy, to taking prescription medications, to residing with his parents, to complying with requirements put forth by the child services agency in Canada.  Since a party raised ameliorative measures, the court “should” consider them, and this court did, following the scheme set forth in Golan v. Saada.  In doing so, the Court concluded that the ameliorative measures failed to “adequately address Petitioner’s lack of serious mental health treatment.” Further, none of them addressed “Petitioner’s history of aggressive behavior and coercive control.”  Lastly, “none of the measures adequately protect the children from Petitioner’s pedophilia.”  The district court therefore denied the Petitioner’s request to return the children, and the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado likewise examined ameliorative measures when a 15-year-old child advised the judge, in an in-camera interview, that she had been sexually abused by her father and felt her mother would not protect her.  In Johnson v. Johnson, the district court found insufficient evidence that the Petitioner Father would move out of the family home upon the child’s return, that the Bahamian law enforcement would conduct a thorough or impartial investigation, and that the Petitioner Parents would not place their daughter into a hospital or institution upon her return, for having embarrassed them in this litigation.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona discussed ameliorative measures after the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded a return order based on the Golan v. Saada opinion.  In this case, Radu v. Shon, the district court had ordered the parties’ children returned to Germany several times, at times with the ameliorative measure that their Respondent Mother return with them. Approximately two months after the Golan v. Saada opinion, when on remand, the district court again ordered the children’s return, concluding that “the ameliorative measure set forth in its December 30, 2021 Order – namely, that Respondent return with OSR and MSR to Germany – satisfies the requirements outlined in Golan.”  The court entered this order without an evidentiary hearing, finding that holding one would cause additional delay.  The Respondent Mother appealed to the Ninth Circuit again, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the return order in March 2023 in Radu III.  A key issue that Respondent Mother has indicated she plans on putting back before the U.S. Supreme Court relates to how the district court gathered information about ameliorative measures.  Namely, the district court had initiated contact with the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague Abduction Convention, which connected the judge with the German Central Authority, to gather information about proceedings and resources in Germany to protect the children. Note that the Hague Conference’s Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(b) states, “[i]n line with the relevant laws and procedures and where it is deemed appropriate in evaluating assertions of grave risk, courts can seek additional information through Central Authorities in order to better understand the legal framework or child protection system in place in the State of habitual residence, or to clarify certain assertions of facts.” (para. 91).  The Guide stresses that the Central Authority is not to evaluate assertions of grave risk.  Central Authorities have a responsibility under the Convention to “cooperate with each other and to promote cooperation among internal authorities to secure the prompt return of the child …”. (para. 96)

Perhaps the most illustrative application of the Golan v. Saada opinion was in Saada v. Golan itself, upon remand. On August 31, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York again ordered the parties’ minor child returned to Italy after the Supreme Court vacated the prior return order and remanded the case for review under its new jurisprudence. The district court concluded that the Saada/Golan family’s circumstances “obviously suggested” a review of ameliorative measures, and that the court had extensively examined such ameliorative measures at the original trial, even going so far on a prior remand to request the parents seek a protective order from the Italian courts that would be implemented when the child was returned.  Therefore, the district court again ordered the minor child returned to Italy.  At present, the case is in a brand-new posture, with the original Respondent Mother having passed away in October 2022, and a new Respondent Aunt being substituted.  Both parties have been filing new pleadings, making additional assertions and arguments for the court to consider.  To date, the court has not yet rendered a new decision on the Respondent Aunt’s current retention of the child in New York.  In its most recent proceedings, the court requested a member of the International Hague Network of Judges in the United States to prevail upon their Italian counterpart for additional information about ameliorative measures that exist in Italy if the child were returned, including the posture of the custody litigation in Italy, the potential for social services to be involved, and the intervention by family in Italy to care for the child in lieu of foster care.  Right now, the parties are hurling various allegations against one another, but the judge has not made any factual findings or rendered a new opinion on the Petitioner Father’s request to return the child to Italy.

Therefore, to date, it appears from the cases that have been heard since Golan v. Saada, judges are recognizing their discretion to consider ameliorative measures, and are doing so when counsel/a party presents evidence of such a measure or it is obviously suggested by the circumstances in the case, including when there are allegations of domestic violence.  A consideration of ameliorative measures is not a foregone conclusion that the child will be returned.  Competent counsel has been tending to raise ameliorative measures as soon as a Respondent Parent asserts a grave risk argument, meaning that the grave risk and ameliorative measures are routinely considered at the same trial as part of a full analysis.  It also seems that judges will become more accustomed to using the resources available to them, namely the Central Authorities and International Hague Network of Judges, to gather information about ameliorative measures. 

ECtHR’s Lost Opportunities in its Transformative Rulings: Queer Interpretation of Right to Privacy and Protection from Discrimination

/ Sarthak Gupta / Leave a comment
European Court of Human Rights © Christian Lemâle

Previous year the European Court of Human Rights [‘the Court’ or ‘ECtHR’] delivered some significant rulings strengthening ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Article 8 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights [‘Convention’] concerning Queer rights. The author in this article revisits three rulings of the ECtHR to argue that, nevertheless of being progressive rulings, the Court did fall short in addressing some major issues.

Firstly, in AM v. Russia, the Court ruled that Russian Court violated Trans individual’s rights under Article 8 read with Article 14 of the Convention by ending all contact between a trans woman and her children without a balanced and reasonable assertion of the legitimate interests [see here & here].

In the AM case, the Russian authorities and the applicant’s wife argued that the applicant is suffering from Transsexualism and further contended that the applicant’s intention to disclose her gender transition information to her children will impact their mental health and psychological development. This institutionalised prejudice of Russian authorities, nevertheless of ‘homosexuality propaganda law’ being held as unconstitutional in the state, exacerbates the ‘vicious wheel’ connected with prejudiced perceptions against trans individuals and a lack of education and awareness on Queer rights. The Court fails to address this elephant in the room, that how these prejudiced notions could impact the children’s education and perception about their parent’s gender identity.

When addressing the ‘best interests of the children’s, the Court had the chance to conceptualise the children’s right to non-discrimination on the grounds of their parents’ gender identity under Article 2 Convention on the Rights of the Child [‘CRC’], and the right to preserve personal relations and direct communication with both parents continuously under Article 9/3 CRC. Further, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment no. 14 also stipulates their right to receive information on Queer Community challenges as well as gender identity and transition under Article 13 CRC and the right to education under Article 28 and, Article 29 of the CRC. Arguably, the ECtHR could have delved into significant length concerning the challenges with utilizing negative preconceptions about transgender individuals to rationalize restraining relationships and communication between transgender parents and their children.

In the second ruling, the Fedotova v. Russia, the Court ruled that Russia’s failure to provide same-sex couples with the opportunity to have their relationships formally acknowledged in form of a marriage, or in any other form is in violation of Article 8 & 10 [see here and here].

Nevertheless, the application was brought for recognition of same-sex marriage, the Court doesn’t feel adequate to discuss Article 12 [‘right to marry’] anywhere in the ruling. The Court concluded that the moral views of the majority cannot be used to deny sexual minorities access to forms of legal recognition. Taking reference from queer interpretations of the ECHR (here and here), which consider the inherent heteronormative (i.e. bi-genderism) notion of most of the Convention’s rights and how to transgress this dialectic. Regardless of the fact (which is still unclear), whether the applicant didn’t include Article 12 or not, the Court itself could have incorporated Article 12 of its own volition.

Not only Supreme Courts of other jurisdictions [the US and South Africa] but also the international institutions like Inter American Court of Human Rights [‘IACtHR’] have rejected the anti-majoritarian notion. It can be argued, that the Court’s rationale of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, i.e. the appreciation of the majority opinion, remains viable. Furthermore, it can be argued that the ECtHR entirely embraces Article 12’s “heterosexual structure,” principally rendering the article inapplicable to same-sex relationships.

The second issue is the necessity of the non-discrimination principle under Article 14. The applicants did claim on Article 14, however, the Court concluded that it was not relevant because it heretofore ruled the violation of Article 8. Since Dudgeon v. UK, it has been a well-established tenet of the ECtHR that rules that discrimination does not need to be investigated if it is not “a crucial element of the case“. It is unrealistic to contend that the lack of legal recognition does not have a severe discriminatory intent in a nation where same-sex individuals are continuously stigmatised and marginalised, where even the Constitutional Court supported the law on prohibition on “homosexuality propaganda.”

Lastly, in the  X v. Poland case, the Court ruled that there had been a violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention after the domestic courts had refused to grant custody of the child on the grounds of the mother’s sexual orientation [on mother’s relationship with another woman].

Nevertheless, the observations that the Court concluded in its rationale, which was first observed in the Hoffmann v. Austria and have been repetitively reaffirmed in many of its rulings about allegations of discriminatory treatment against divorced parents, the Court overlooked an outstanding opportunity to state unequivocally that a parent’s sexual orientation does not influence their parental capabilities. The Court could have gone a step forward like it did in Vojnity v. Hungary, where the Court made clear that parents’ religious beliefs per se cannot influence their capacity to raise their children.

In Atala Riffo v. Chile, the IACtHR concluded that the Chilean Courts’ judgement to take children from their homosexual mother’s custody based on her sexual orientation was discriminatory, emphasising that ‘an abstract reference to the child’s best interest… without specific proof of the risks or damage to children that could result from the mother’s sexual orientation’ is not acceptable’

What is more disappointing is that the third-party intervention also highlighted Poland inequalities and prejudices in legal and practical matters concerning rainbow families and the attitude towards the Queer community being negative and Queerphobic. Later, the same was also emphasized by Judge Wojtyczek in his dissenting opinion. However, the Court still neglected to address this concern.

Conclusion: The Test Continues

These judgements are undoubtedly significant and are progressive in protecting trans parents’ rights, same-sex marriage recognition and discrimination on gender identity & sexual orientation. The author doesn’t question their contribution, however, the abovementioned arguments do signify the ECtHR’s inherent narrow approach in Queer Interpretation of Article 8 and 14. The ECtHR’s upcoming opportunities here, here and here, will further demonstrate the extent to which the Court is inclined to tread unprecedented ground in terms of acknowledging rainbow family relationships.

Discussion Friday 3 April: Domestic Violence During COVID-19: Sheltering at Home When Home is the Most Dangerous Place

/ Stephanie Farrior / 1 Comment

The Roosevelt House Human Rights Program of Hunter College and the Sisterhood is Global Institute are hosting a live online discussion on Friday April 3 with frontline women’s rights activists from across the world.

Friday, April 3, 2020 1:00 pm – 2:00 pm EDT (17.00 – 18.00 GMT)

For victims of domestic violence, home is often the most dangerous place on earth. As the world moves towards lockdown to prevent the spread of COVID-19, women may have no safe place to turn. Moderated by Jessica Neuwirth, the discussion will explore current realities of domestic violence victims and solutions for supporting women in this vulnerable moment.

Discussants:
Carmen Espinoza, Executive Director of Manuela Ramos in Peru
Shafiqa Noori, Director of Humanitarian Assistance for Women and Children of Afghanistan
Diane Rosenfeld, Lecturer on Law and Director of the Gender Violence Program at Harvard Law School
Randa Siniora, Executive Director of the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling in Palestine

Registration is required. You may register here and join at zoom.us/j/580841531. 

A Transformative Approach to Personal Laws

/ Shubhangi Agarwalla / Leave a comment

It’s been a busy few weeks for the Indian Supreme Court with both gains and loses. Notably, in the Sabarimala judgement, Justice Chandrachud observed that the rationale used by the Bombay High Court in Narasu Appa Mali v State of Bombay, which held that personal laws should not be subject to fundamental rights, is not sustainable. Chandrachud, however, only overrules Narasu on the point that customs are not subject to fundamental rights.

This exposition in itself is unremarkable since the Supreme Court in Sant Ram v. Labh Singh had already held that customs are subject to a fundamental rights challenge. The ratio of Narasu Appa Mali only extended to uncodified religious law which hasn’t been modified by either custom or usage. Thus, while the outcome remains unchanged, the observation by Chandrachud that the reasoning of Narasu is flawed, segues into the question of whether personal law can be counted as law and thereby lays the groundwork for a challenge to personal laws when it arises.

What are personal laws?

To set some context to the debate, it might be useful to understand what personal laws are. The idea that religious sphere is entirely distinct is of recent vintage it was through a process of construction during the British era that a separate space was carved out for certain religious laws, generally governing family matters like marriage and divorce. Thus, the first point to note is that there is nothing inherently personal about personal laws. The scriptures gained jurisdiction over certain matters because the colonial state said so, and this determination was due to sociopolitical rather than religious reasons.  It is untenable therefore to think that the body of laws referred to as “personal laws” derive their validity from religion, rather than the state. Second, personal laws were shaped by male elites of each religious community using the colonial state. For example, with regard to Hindu personal law, there was a forced homogenization and enforcement of Brahmanical law. Today, many personal laws are alleged to promote the subordination of women and other minorities. However, to have a fundamental rights review, ‘personal laws’ has to fall under the definition of ‘law’ or a ‘law in force’ in Article 13 of the Constitution.

Narasu Appa Mali v State of Bombay

The petition in Narasu challenged validity of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Hindu Marriages Act, 1946 which sought to render bigamous marriages void as well as criminalize the offence of bigamy. What the Court ultimately ended up deciding was the question of whether coming into force of constitution, muslim polygamy is void because it violates Art. 15. This might be explained by the dominant narrative prevailing in the country during the early 1950s. At the time the judgement was pronounced, the Hindu Code Bill was still in deliberation and the general sentiment was that only the Hindus were being ‘punished’. It might be useful to keep this context in mind while evaluating the rationale of the two judge bench.

Prior to determining whether muslim polygamy is unconstitutional, the Court had to answer the question of whether it is law in the first place. To answer this question, the Court looked at Article 13 and applied the principle of ‘Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius’ i.e. the expression of one excludes the other, and its present application. It characterised customs & usages as deviations from personal laws and relied on Article 112 of the Government of India Act, 1915 which had discussed customs as different from personal laws, to say that personal laws cannot be laws under Article 13. The inclusion of various provisions in the Constitution that relate to state regulation of personal law, such as Article 17 (Abolition of untouchability), Article 25 (Freedom of Religion) would be redundant had the drafters wanted to include personal laws within the definition of law. It further relied on Art. 44, which asks the state to endeavour to build a Uniform Civil Code, to say that there is a presumption by the drafters that different personal laws will exist even after independence. Moreover, Article 44 and Entry V of the Concurrent List seems to suggest that the drafter’s intent was to give this power to the legislature and not the judiciary. It also referred to Article 372 of the Constitution. Pre-constitutional laws continue in force by virtue of this Article, and that they can be amended by the President. The Court reasoned that since the President had no power to modify personal laws, personal laws do not derive their validity from Article 372 of the Constitution.

Re-evaluating Narasu Appa Mali

Narasu has never been challenged in the Supreme Court. Previous decisions such as John Vallamottam v Union of India and C Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri Swaminathaswamiswaminathaswami which are commonly cited as examples of the Court subjecting personal laws to a fundamental rights review, only dealt with codified personal law.

However, there is some literature offering a contrary view. Krishnan argues that the term ‘includes’ in Article 13 is an inclusive definition. For example, Art. 13(3)(a) does not use the word “common law” and yet we subject that to Part III. There is no evidence to suggest that the drafter were referring to the Government of India Act, 1915 in drafting this section. As Bhatia argues, Article 17 could have just been incorporated by way of abundant caution. The corrosive and pervasive nature of caste discrimination could have made the framers include a specific article prohibiting untouchability as an extra measure to leave nothing to chance.  Moreover, the scope of Article 25 is way broader than personal laws.  It protects an individual’s right to practice her religion rather than protecting religious norms or rules. Article 44 is located in Part 4 of the Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy) and therefore casts no positive obligation on the State. Many Directive Principles duplicate obligations that would arise from fundamental rights themselves.

However, the question ultimately comes down to how we understand our constitution. Should we read the Constitution textually, debating the technical points of law or should we read it as a transformative document capable of bending the moral arc of the Indian polity towards justice. In the words of Chandrachud-

“Custom, usages and personal law have a significant impact on the civil status of individuals. Those activities that are inherently connected with the civil status of individuals cannot be granted constitutional immunity merely because they may have some associational features which have a religious nature. To immunize them from constitutional scrutiny, is to deny the primacy of the Constitution.”

Not only was the Constitution transformative in the sense that it indicated a break from India’s past, but it also has a transformative potential. At the heart of transformative constitutionalism is vision of change, a redemptive potential. By subjecting personal laws to a fundamental rights challenge would mean acknowledging how some of these laws have becomes sites of hierarchy and subordination, where minorities like women and lower castes are denied equal moral membership of society. A transformative vision places the individual dignity at the forefront of its endeavours and values constitutional morality over societal morality. Here’s hoping that when the challenge to personal laws comes, it is also on these grounds.

Write On! U.S. Feminist Judgments Project

/ Osazenoriuwa Ebose / Leave a comment

backlit_keyboardThis installment of Write On!, our periodic compilation of calls for papers, includes a call to present within Feminist Judgements: Rewritten Family Law Opinions, as follows:

► The U.S. Feminist Judgement Project, seeks contributions for rewritten judicial opinions and commentaries for an edited collection tentatively titled Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Family Law Opinions. The list of selected cases, a description of the process of selecting decisions, and the opinions considered but not included, are on the application website (https://goo.gl/forms/9JYv7GtR2gJMDVbY2).

Continue reading →

Read On! New Book on Public Law of Gender

/ kimrub / Leave a comment

I am delighted to contribute my first post to this excellent website to let readers know of the final book in a six volume series, Connecting International Law with Public Law, which I initiated as part of my former position as Director of the Centre for International and Public law at the ANU (2006-2015).  The first five volumes looks at themes including Sanctions, Access to Medicines, Environmental Discourses, Allegiance and Identity, and Security Institutions and have been published through Cambridge University Press.

The final volume has just been launched and it is of particular interest to the IntLawGrrls community.

I have co-edited this final volume with my friend and former ANU colleague Dr. Katharine Young, who is now at Boston University, and it is called The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global. The volume brings together leading lawyers, political scientists, historians and philosophers.

The book examines the worldwide sweep of gender-neutral, gender-equal or gender-sensitive public laws in international treaties, national constitutions and statutes, and documents the raft of legal reform and critically analyses its effectiveness. In demarcating the academic study of the public law of gender, the book examines law’s structuring of politics, governing and gender in a new global frame.

Of interest to constitutional and statutory designers, advocates, adjudicators and scholars, the contributions explore how concepts such as equality, accountability, representation, participation and rights, depend on, challenge or enlist gendered roles and/or categories. These enquiries suggest that the new public law of gender must confront the lapses in enforcement, sincerity and coverage that are common in both national and international law and governance, and critically and pluralistically recast the public/private distinction in family, community, religion, customary and market domains.  The book outlines the common and distinct challenges and issues across various fields and it provides those working with gender-sensitive laws and gender-neutral laws with an assessment of the various ways in which public law interacts with gender, by intent or outcome. It also uncovers the local and global perspectives and the obstacles facing gender equality, equity and parity, showing how traditional agendas of feminist theory now translate in a global legal frame.

I would encourage any one interested in reviewing the volume (or any of the set of six, or indeed the whole set!) for a journal to contact Elizabeth Spicer at Cambridge University Press- espicer [at] cambridge.org.

Professor Kim Rubenstein, ANU College of Law, Public Policy Fellow, Australian National University

International Perspectives and Empirical Findings on Child Participation: from Social Exclusion to Child-Inclusive Policies (Oxford 2015)

/ Benedetta Faedi Duramy / Leave a comment

Cover for<br /><br /> International Perspectives and Empirical Findings on Child Participation<br /><br /> Edited by Tali Gal & Benedetta Faedi Duramy

The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has inspired advocates and policy makers across the globe, injecting children’s rights terminology into various public and private arenas. Children’s right to participate in decision-making processes affecting their lives is the acme of the Convention and its central contribution to the children’s rights discourse. At the same time the participation right presents enormous challenges in its implementation. Laws, regulations and mechanisms addressing children’s right to participate in decision-making processes affecting their lives have been established in many jurisdictions across the globe. Yet these worldwide developments have only rarely been accompanied with empirical investigations. The effectiveness of various policies in achieving meaningful participation for children of different ages, cultures and circumstances have remained largely unproven empirically. Therefore, with the growing awareness of the importance of evidence-based policies, it becomes clear that without empirical investigations on the implementation of children’s right to participation it is difficult to promote their effective inclusion in decision making.

This book provides a much-needed, first broad portrayal of how child participation is implemented in practice today. Bringing together 19 chapters written by prominent authors from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, and Israel, the book includes descriptions of programs that engage children and youth in decision-making processes, as well as insightful findings regarding what children, their families, and professionals think about these programs. Beyond their contribution to the empirical evidence on ways children engage in decision-making processes, the volume’s chapters contribute to the theoretical development of the meaning of “participation,” “citizenship,” “inclusiveness,” and “relational rights” in regards to children and youth. There is no matching to the book’s scope both in terms of its breadth of subjects and the diversity of jurisdictions it covers. The book’s chapters include experiences of child participation in special education, child protection, juvenile justice, restorative justice, family disputes, research, and policy making.

The book is available on Oxford University Press and Amazon.

Write On! Call for papers: ‘The Rule of Law in addressing Violence against Children: Success or Failure?’ (deadline 15 March)

/ Karen Hoffmann / Leave a comment

a38contrario

A38 Online Law Journal and A CONTRARIO will be hosting a joint online legal symposium in April 2015 titled “The Rule of Law in addressing Violence against Children: Success or Failure?”

Violence against children has become an unfortunate trend worldwide. Despite the growth of international instruments, national laws, and political pledges to protect children from harm, violence towards children continues to increase. Recent examples include attacks by the Boko Haram against children, gun violence in schools, institutional child sex abuse, and the continued use of child soldiers in conflicts. Given the severity of these kinds of situations, has the rule of law succeeded or failed in protecting children against violence? Is there a necessity for more legal regimes to protect children from violence or are the current laws enough? Are there examples of successful legal regimes in protecting children from violence?

Inspired by the recent people’s movement in the United Kingdom to end the impunity of perpetrators of child sex abuse, this online symposium seeks law articles which address these questions through the lens of either national or international law. The symposium also seeks to increase relevant and practical legal discourse on this important issue with a global audience.

Submission Details:

Authors are to submit a short bio and their articles by March 15, 2015.

Articles which are 1,500 words (including footnotes) or less should be submitted to A CONTRARIO ICL at acontrarioicl@gmail.com with subject line “Symposium.” (http://acontrarioicl.com)

Articles which are 3,000 -10,000 words (including footnotes) should be submitted to A38 Online Law Journal at submissions@athirtyeight.com with subject line “Symposium.” (www.athirtyeight.com)

Founder of the Abuelas Identifies Her Grandson

/ Elizabeth Ludwin King / 1 Comment

At long last, Estela Carlotto has identified and been acquainted with her grandson.

The founder of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, a group dedicated to locating the some 500 children who were either born in captivity or disappeared along with their parents during Argentina’s Dirty War (1976-1983), has been searching for her grandson for thirty-six years, all while watching – and celebrating – as over 100 other grandmothers were reunited with their grandchildren. Last week, the results of a voluntary DNA test confirmed that Ignacio Hurban was born to Carolotto’s daughter, Laura, while she was in captivity in the La Cacha clandestine detention center in the province of Buenos Aires.

Carlotto with her grandson Ignacio (photo credit)

Carlotto with her grandson Ignacio
(photo credit)

As yours truly has written before, children either born in captivity or disappeared along with their parents were often placed with childless families that supported the dictatorship. In addition to the Abuelas‘ efforts to identify these (now adult) children, prosecutors across the country are charging people suspected of stealing babies during the dictatorship. Each discovery of one of these children raises several issues and questions:

►Were the families that raised them complicit in the circumstances of their arrival, or were they innocent third parties? What level of knowledge would be enough for a prosecutor to bring charges?

►Does the grandchild want to be identified? In Carlotto’s case, Ignacio chose to provide his DNA after wondering if he might be one of the grandchildren the Abuelas were working to find, but others in the same situation prefer to retain their privacy.

►What is the scope of the right to an identity; relatedly, what is the scope of the right to the truth?

Thirty years after the dictatorship ended, these and other questions remain. Carlotto will continue fighting on behalf of the Abuelas, saying that “there is still a lot to do.”

On the Job! Child Rights International Network (CRIN) seeks Legal Research Assistant

/ Karen Hoffmann / Leave a comment

From CRIN comes this posting:

CRIN is looking for a Legal Research Assistant to support our ‘access to justice for children’ project.

CRIN is conducting a global research project examining the ways that violations of children’s rights can be challenged at the national level and how national legal systems are set up to help or prevent children from accessing justice. More information on the project is available at: http://www.crin.org/en/home/law/access

We are looking for someone to assist primarily with reviewing and editing the country reports and undertaking further legal research. The Legal Research Assistant will also contribute to analysing the findings and preparing a global report and ranking, and assist with other legal research tasks and analysis as required.

CRIN is a small international children’s rights advocacy network based in central London. Aside from sharing our values, we are looking for someone who takes initiative, is flexible, creative, and wants to work in a multicultural environment.

We will provide you with the opportunity to work as part of a small team of dedicated and passionate people and the chance to shape and contribute to a growing and exciting new area of children’s rights advocacy.

For more information on how to apply, see https://www.crin.org/en/home/about/work-us/legal-research-assistant.