violence against women

Migrant Worker Women Advancing Gender Equity through the USMCA

/ rachelmicahjones / Leave a comment

Men only, 18–35 years old. 

In 2021, seeing a job posting with those words is startling. Shocking even. But more than a year into a world-changing pandemic that has pushed millions of women out of paid work, U.S. employers continue to discriminate against women, posting ads like that one. To evade legal consequences, U.S. businesses discriminate in Mexico, hiring men to work in the United States with temporary H-2 guestworker visas while turning women away. Other U.S. businesses discriminate by hiring women but channeling them into lower-paying jobs with poorer conditions than those they hire men for. Although the U.S. government knows that H-2 employers discriminate against women, it has done little to stop them. 

For more than fifteen years, since I founded Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. (CDM)—the first transnational workers’ rights organization based in Mexico and the United States—I have heard from women in Mexico about patterns of abuse in the U.S. H-2 programs. Migrant women have courageously spoken out about blatant discrimination in H-2 recruitment and hiring, sexual harassment and other violence against women at work, unfair pay, and unlawful working conditions. Women report discrimination in industries ranging from Maryland’s blue crab processors to fruit and vegetable sorting. Sex discrimination persists in H-2 labor supply chains even though U.S. law prohibits employers and labor recruiters from discriminating against women. Laws prohibiting discrimination protect all women who work in the United States, even if businesses hire them outside of the country.

Today, migrant women continue the fight for gender justice. In March, in honor of Women’s History Month, CDM and workers’ rights organizations across North America joined migrant women in filing the first viable state-to-state complaint under the new United States-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA). The USMCA’s labor chapter, Article 23, requires the United States to enforce its anti-discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In failing to root out discrimination in H-2 recruiting, hiring, and employment and neglecting to ensure gender equity in the program, the United States is violating Article 23. 

In the complaint, we collectively make three demands:

  1. The U.S. government must end sex discrimination in the H-2 guestworker programs once and for all.
  2. The government must ensure that all workers have access to Legal Services Corporation-funded civil legal services. (Without lawyers working in solidarity with them, it is nearly impossible for migrant women to access justice through U.S. courts.)
  3. The government must investigate discrimination complaints from women in the H-2 program under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, rather than ignoring or summarily dismissing them.

And to increase pressure on the Administration, we are filing a supplemental complaint with Professor Sarah Paoletti, a Practice Professor of Law and the Director of the Transnational Legal Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. The supplement will address the U.S. government’s obligations under the ILO and international human rights law to end discrimination in the H-2 program.

We have reasons to be hopeful that the USMCA can serve as a tool to improve access to transnational justice for migrant workers. Unlike NAFTA—the old trade agreement with its toothless labor side accord—the USMCA has a mechanism for migrant workers and their advocates to push governments to comply with labor and employment laws—or face sanctions. Concretely, this means that the U.S. government may face sanctions if it maintains the status quo and ignores the grave abuses that the petitioners report in the H-2 program. It means that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission must end its practice of failing to investigate and meaningfully respond to migrant women’s discrimination complaints. And it means that the U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland Security must stop allowing H-2 employers to discriminate without consequences. In receiving and reviewing our petition, the governments are legally responsible for showing us that they meant what they said about protecting migrant workers’ and women’s rights when they signed the agreement. 

The historic process for the migrant women petitioners began in Mexico, where we filed the USMCA complaint with the Mexican government. Mexico formally accepted the complaint and is now investigating discrimination and other abuses in the agricultural and protein processing industries, the industries in which the petitioners work. Earlier this month, Mexico asked the United States to honor its obligations under the USMCA and invited cooperation in doing so. And now the Biden-Harris Administration has the opportunity to make good on the promise of the USMCA and proactively address the urgent issues we raise in the complaint.

For too long, U.S. businesses have used the H-2 programs to bypass our civil rights and labor laws. Left without government oversight, H-2 employers have enacted their sexist, racist, and ageist ideas about the kinds of workers who maximize profitability. Sex discrimination in the H-2 program harms not only migrant women from Mexico but also U.S.-based workers. 

Over the next year, as we rebuild the U.S. economy for a sustainable and equitable recovery, justice for migrant women must be at the fore of the government’s labor and employment policies and practices. And next Women’s History Month, we look forward to celebrating meaningful, sustainable reforms in the H-2 program that will end discrimination against migrant women and promote access to justice. 

We would be grateful for your support in standing with migrant worker women to fight against discrimination. Please email me (rachel@cdmigrante.org) to join the supplemental complaint on the U.S. government’s obligations under the ILO or to submit an amicus in support of migrant worker women. 

Human Trafficking as a Gendered Phenomenon: CEDAW and a missing jigsaw piece – Part II

/ Gema Fernandez & Keina Yoshida / Leave a comment

In the first part of this blog, we provided a summary of our article “Human Trafficking as A Gendered Phenomenon: CEDAW in Perspective” in which we argue that the CEDAW Committee is an important actor whose voice should be heard when discussing States obligations towards the elimination of trafficking and that Article 6 of the Convention needs further clarification/development.

Since publication of our article we have continued to ask ourselves how and why trafficking is divorced from the issue of violence against women within CEDAW’s framework. This posts sets out part of this brief history as a prelude to our article and as part of the history of women’s rights advocacy on these issues. We hope that others can elaborate on the schism between Article 6 and violence against women, and the ongoing lack of a GR on human trafficking.

Gender-Based Violence Against Women

Last year, the CEDAW Committee updated General Recommendation No 19 on violence against women in its General Recommendation No 35 (2017). This GR has garnered much attention for both its content and for its procedure with over 100 women’s groups, NGOs and stakeholders contributing to its promulgation.[1] The Recommendation, which acts as authoritative guidance on the Committee’s interpretation of the Convention’s provisions in relation to violence, acknowledges that despite advances in the field since GR19, gender-based violence against women remains pervasive in all countries of the world and it manifests in a continuum, in a range of settings.[2] The updated substantive statement on gender-based violence against women is a reminder of where we have come and where we still have to go to eradicate violence, and make the right to live a life free from violence a reality.[3]

GR 35 however does not however deal with the issue of human trafficking of women and girls. While trafficking has been mentioned in a number of the Committee’s General Recommendations (GR 26, 28, and 35) the Committee has only done so in passing, instead commenting in its GR on migrant workers that the phenomenon of trafficking could be more comprehensively addressed in its own GR on Article 6. It has remained a mystery to us as to why the Committee has remained interpretatively silent on an important substantive article, leading us to question why Article 6 and violence against women have become separated and whether the Committee has always taken this approach.

An Archaeological Dig

It is well known that the Convention did not include a substantive article on violence against women and that instead GR19 marked an important step in the Committee’s interpretation of the Convention to make explicit the link between violence and discrimination. An analysis of the CEDAW Committee’s session minutes indicates that at the time of drafting GR19, Article 6 (trafficking) formed an integral part of that discussion. GR19 was adopted at the eleventh session, and it was and still is a landmark statement on gender-based violence. It provides an article by article approach setting out how the different articles of the Convention interact and relate to violence against women.

Interestingly, the minutes of the 10th and 11th sessions seem to indicate that originally violence and trafficking were to be considered together in one general recommendation.  The report mentions an anticipated discussion of Article 6 of the Convention and that members were asked to consider the report of the Secretary General on Violence against Women in all its forms, which contained the report of the Expert Group Meeting on Violence against Women, held in Vienna in 1991. We then see that a member (anonymised) expresses concern over the lack of coordination of the CEDAW Committee with the Expert Group and the Commission of the Status of Women. Different experts voiced their consideration at the risk of duplication. One member asked if “it was perhaps necessary to have two separate recommendations: one on violence and one on article 6”.

The report then records that GR19 was adopted as a response to the Expert Group Meeting on Violence against Women and that comments of the Working Group on Article 6, would be picked up at a later session. Ms Bustelo and Ms Aouij volunteered to prepare draft general comments for the next session. At the 12th session, the Working Group recommended that the work should be continued. The minutes of the 12th session thus further indicate that there has been long-standing work on a General Recommendation on Article 6 yet it is unclear from the later minutes what happened and why this GR has not come to fruition. This mystery is underlined further by the Committee’s own statement in the GR on migrant women that there should be a separate recommendation in relation to Article 6 and trafficking.

Conclusion

The work of the Committee continues today and is phenomenally important to women’s rights advocates. The Committee’s work on gender-based violence against women as a form of discrimination together with its specialised status in interpreting human rights norms and obligations in relation to women has been significant and influential. In the context where regional and international courts and tribunals have yet to grasp how trafficking is a gendered phenomenon CEDAW’s interpretative expertise is welcome, and in our view, long overview. Understandably, the Committee has many competing issues to deal with, and we recognise that Article 6 presents particular theoretical and political challenges.  However, the seriousness and pervasiveness of the violations of women and girls’ rights who suffer from human trafficking and exploitation in prostitution demands the Committee’s specialised and expert action. The enactment of GR35 forms another historical moment for the Committee, and for us another reminder that more has to be done to tackle trafficking against women and girls.

[1] ‘The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 35. A renewed vision for a world free of gender-based violence against women’, available at http://ehrac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EHRAC-Winter-2017-WEB.pdf.

[2] ‘CEDAW General Recommendation 35 draws an explicit link between gender, discrimination and conflict-related violence against women’, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/09/12/cedaw-general-recommendation-35-draws-an-explicit-link-between-gender-discrimination-and-conflict-related-violence-against-women/

[3] ‘CEDAW General Recommendation 35 on violence against women is a significant step forward’, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/09/06/cedaw-general-recommendation-35-on-violence-against-women-is-a-significant-step-forward/

Human Trafficking as a Gendered Phenomenon – Part I

/ Gema Fernandez & Keina Yoshida / Leave a comment

This is part 1 of a two-part post on human trafficking as a gendered phenomenon. In this first part we provide a brief contextualisation to the issue and introduce our recently published article examining the relationship between the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and human trafficking. In the second post, we take a historical look at how the issue of trafficking became divorced from the Committee’s work on violence against women.

Trafficking in human beings is a gendered phenomenon.[1] An estimated 79% of all detected trafficking victims are women and children and traffickers are ‘overwhelmingly male’.[2] As the former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences (Special Rapporteur on VAWG) commented in her 15 year review of the mandate, human trafficking is one of the major areas of concern with regards to violence against women (alongside domestic violence, sexual violence in conflict and reproductive rights violations).[3]  The Special Rapporteur on VAWG commented that there has been a marked shift on policy in this area from a ‘prostitution framework’ to a framework which places human rights at the centre of the debate. The Declaration on Violence against Women (DEVAW) confirms this view and recognizes human trafficking as a form of violence against women (Article 2(b)). Further, violence against women has now been recognized as a form of discrimination against women.[4] It is therefore clear that human trafficking is a form of violence and discrimination against women.

More recently, trafficking has been recognised as one of the main forms of violence that women face in the context of migration.[5] Trafficked women and girls often face different forms of gender-based violence such as sexual violence, rape, violation of their reproductive rights, and slavery both in destination and during their trip. Trafficking may constitute torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and it has been identified as a threat to international peace and security by the Security Council (S/RES/2331 (2016)). States of origin, transit, and destination have obligations to prevent trafficking, protect victims (within their territory and from refoulement to a country where there is a risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including the risk of re-trafficking), and to prosecute traffickers. For States to comply with these obligations, victims must be properly identified and identification proceedings must be put in place at strategic points on migration routes and access to asylum proceedings must be granted.

In practice, much remains to be done to implement a human rights and a gender approach to trafficking that can provide justice to those who have suffered violations of their rights due to human trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labour and other forms of exploitation, slavery and servitude. Most States aim to combat human trafficking from a migrant model a criminal justice perspective and more recently a security approach, thus neglecting the rights of trafficking victims.

In our article “Human Trafficking as A Gendered Phenomenon: CEDAW in Perspective”, we argue that CEDAW is an important human rights instrument in the fight against trafficking in human beings. By way of brief introduction, the Convention is an international human rights treaty dedicated to women and girls. It has been described as ‘the definitive international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of women.’[6] At the core of the Women’s Convention is the eradication of discrimination against women and States parties to the Convention accept wide-ranging obligations to promote equality in all spheres of life.[7]

Trafficking is expressly prohibited under CEDAW in Article 6, which mandates states to take all appropriate measures to supress trafficking and the exploitation of prostitution. We argued that given the disproportionate number of women and girls who are trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour, the Convention is a valuable instrument, contextualising trafficking in the context of structural inequality, violence and discrimination. Further, the Committee’s General Recommendation No.30 and General Recommendation No. 35 point to some of the underlying factos which make women vulnerable to being trafficked including conflict, extractive industries, global supply chains and natural disasters. Significantly no State party has entered a reservation to Article 6.

However, Article 6 does not define the terms trafficking and exploitation of prostitution and the scope and contours of the obligation remain uncertain. Through an analysis of the Committee’s jurisprudence, we found that the Committee has yet to find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention finding all cases pleading Article 6 inadmissible. Further, the Committee has yet to draft a specific general recommendation on Article 6 which seems to be a glaring omission. CEDAW should make good its promise and provide substantive guidance on the scope of Article 6 of the Convention and States obligations to suppress and tackle trafficking. We argue that this is especially necessary given the lack of gender and structural analysis of trafficking by other regional and international courts and bodies and the brevity with which trafficking is dealt with in General Recommendation No 35 on violence against women.

[1] The Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons. ‘The gender dimensions of human trafficking’, Issue Brief #4, 2017.

[2] The UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016 notes that an increasing number of men have been detected as trafficking victims, United Nations Publication. Available at www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf

[3] 15 years of The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/15YearReviewofVAWMandate.pdf

[4] General Recommendation No. 35 (CEDAW) see paragraph 1 and 7. Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28.

[5] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on Migration-Related Torture and Ill-Treatment, February 2018, A/HRC/37/50, available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/A_HRC_37_50_EN.pdf

[6] Rebecca Cook ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women’ 30 Virginia J Intl’l Law (1990) 643, at 643.

[7] Andrew Byrnes and Marsha A. Freeman ‘The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths to Equality A Study for the World Bank’ University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2012, paper 7.

Landmark decision in first case of domestic violence brought to ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) (Ruling ECW/CCJ/APP/26/15, 24th January 2017)

/ Siobhan Airey / 3 Comments

In a decision that can be interpreted a historic milestone and a ‘triple high-five’ for the promotion of accountability for women’s human rights in Africa; for the recognition of violence against women as a violation of human rights, and for the emerging role of African regional courts in addressing human rights issues, on the 24th of January, 2017, the ECOWAS Court (the ECCJ or the Court) ruled that it has the competence to hear a case of domestic violence instituted against the Federal Government of Nigeria by two NGOs. I review that decision in this post.

The NGOs – the Women Advocates Research Documentation Centre (WARDC) and the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) – had jointly filed a suit in August 2015 at the Court on behalf of Nigerian citizen, Ms. Mary Sunday, an alleged victim of severe domestic violence from her fiancé (a policeman), which had taken place three years earlier in August 2012.

WARDA and IHRDA alleged that since the attack happened, the Nigerian authorities had failed to carry out an independent and impartial investigation on the allegations of severe domestic violence suffered by Ms. Sunday.  As a result of the lack of effective investigation and prosecution of the offender, they argued that the Nigerian government had violated several rights of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, and other international human rights agreements. These rights included the right to dignity, to freedom from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, and the right to a remedy.

The case was filed before the Court for human rights violations pursuant to Article 3 of the Supplementary Protocol of the Court. This provision gives the Court the competence to determine matters of human rights violations of citizens of the ECOWAS Community. The Nigerian government lodged a preliminary objection based on three grounds; that the Applicants had not established a cause of action; that the Applicants had no locus standi, and that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court was urged to dismiss and strike out the case for lack of merit.

In delivering the Court’s ruling, the Honourable Justice Micah Wilkins Wright, held that the case was admissible; that the Applicants had established a cause of action and also have locus standi to file the case.

Though this decision relates only to jurisdiction and admissibility by the ECOWAS Court, it is certainly noteworthy for the clear signal communicated by the Court to continue to hear cases relating to women’s human rights.

In 2008, in Mani v. Niger, (Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger, Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 of 27 October 2008, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/491168d42.html), the ECCJ broke new jurisprudential ground on women’s human rights when it found that that the Niger “[B]ecomes responsible under international as well as national law for any form of human rights violations of the applicant founded on slavery because of its tolerance, passivity, inaction and abstention with regard to this practice.” (See paras 84-85, based on its recognition of the failure of the Nigerien courts to denounce the instance of slavery, and the failure of the Nigerien authorities to bring a criminal prosecution. Emphasis my own).

In a decision that drew from instruments and decisions from international criminal law; international human rights law; African, Council of Europe and Inter-American regional human rights instruments; the ECOWAS Revised Treaty and Protocol on the ECCJ, and Nigerien domestic law, the ECCJ demonstrated an innovative interpretive approach to both the crime of slavery, and its particular manifestation for women.

The ECCJ’s openness to hearing cases that directly relate to women’s human rights, and to contributing to human rights jurisprudence at the African level, directly challenges perceptions of African human rights institutions as being ‘weak and ineffectual’ or ‘dysfunctional.’ (This description has been noted by several commentators including Obiora Chinedu Okafor who has observed that most commentators have historically described the workings and effectiveness of the African human rights systems thus. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces, and International Institutions, (CUP, 2007) at 63).

In the under-litigated area of women’s human rights both within regional human rights systems in general, and within international human rights law, this decision on jurisdiction and admissibility by the ECCJ is welcome. We await the details and the results of the hearing with great interest.

NOTE on details on the case;

 

Read On! Gender and Violence in Haiti

/ Jaya Ramji-Nogales / Leave a comment

IntLawGrrl benedetta-faedi-duramy book photoBenedetta Faedi Duramy‘s book, Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents, offers a rich and nuanced description of the complex forces that entangle impoverished Haitian women in cycles of violence, both as subjects and as perpetrators.  Her clear and powerful writing explains in detail the historical evolution of this violence, situating it within a climate of deep gender inequality and desperate poverty.  It is a worthwhile read for that history alone, but goes on to describe in depth the complexities of contemporary Haitian society and the situation of women within it.  Prof. Faedi Duramy catalogues the relevant human rights law and offers practical suggestions as to how it might be applied to ameliorate the condition of Haitian women.  I’ve posted on SSRN a full review of her book, forthcoming next spring in Human Rights Quarterly.  But don’t stop there — the book itself is an engaging and informative though deeply troubling read.

Violence against women: a new binding standard for 2015

/ Lisa Gormley

The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) entered into force on 1 August 2014. As we begin 2015, when the members of the treaty body (GREVIO) will be elected and the process of reviewing states’ conformity with this very detailed and practical convention will begin, it is a good moment to reflect on the possibilities which come with this new binding standard.

While this is a treaty negotiated and adopted within the Council of Europe, its values and antecedents are truly global. The general recommendations, concluding observations and jurisprudence of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, General Assembly Resolutions on violence against women and criminal responses to violence against women, regional treaties on women’s rights from the Americas and Africa were all influential on the content, as was the UN Secretary-General’s in-depth report on violence against women of 2006 and twenty years of insights from three successive Special Rapporteurs on violence against women, its causes and consequences. The treaty was negotiated by state representatives, some of whom were past and present members of CEDAW. Others were experienced members of feminist civil society, with in-depth practical knowledge of the demands of service provision to women escaping gender-based violence.

Christine Chinkin and Renee Romkens acted as advisers to the negotiation, with great distinction. Christine brought a deep knowledge of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law. Renee brought a deep knowledge of the sociological research base on inequality and gender-based violence. Civil society were observers – with limited opportunities to engage with the debates – including the European Women’s Lobby, the ILGA-Europe (the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), WAVE (Women against Violence Europe) and Amnesty International – the organization I represented during the negotiations.

The Istanbul Convention deals with violence against women, including domestic violence, within a legal and policy framework of promoting women’s equality, according to CEDAW Article 1 and the transformative commitment of the entire treaty. Among its purposes is to contribute to “the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and promote substantive equality between women and men, including by empowering women.” (Article 1b). Its 65 substantive articles are based in a practical response to what we know about the practice of violence against women, and how to eradicate it.

The treaty provides for three engines of change to take action on this knowledge basis. At the national level, there is a requirement in Article 10 to establish a coordinating institution, “responsible for the coordination,  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation  of policies and  measures  to  prevent and combat all forms of violence covered by this Convention” which will enforce joined-up thinking and action within each member state. It is also responsible for coordinating the collection of data on violence against women, analysing and disseminate the results of the data. States are required to cooperate positively with civil society organizations (Article 9) and provide “appropriate financial and human resources for the adequate implementation of integrated policies, measures and programmes” (Article 8).

At the international level, there will be a monitoring process by a panel of experts to whom states must provide a report on the implementation of the Convention. The GREVIO is empowered to govern its own procedures (article 68(4)), receive information from civil society (Article 68(5)) and international organizations (Article 68(8)) and make recommendations to states on how to improve their implementation of the Convention. Exceptionally, the GREVIO has powers to undertake urgent reports in order to prevent “serious, massive, or persistent” violations of the Convention (Article 68(13)), even with the power to undertake visits to countries (Article 68(14)).

The third, and most novel, engine for change is to require states parties to invite their parliaments to participate in the monitoring of the implementation of the convention (Article 70), which is apt and resonant given the huge numbers of women affected by gender-based violence. Addressing violence against women is a matter for democratic scrutiny as well as implementation of the rule of law.

Continue reading →

Precipitating Politics Around The Revival of Prosecutions in Bangladesh

/ Beth Van Schaack / 2 Comments

This is part 3 of a three-part series on the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal.  Part 1 (overview) and 2 (deep history) are here and here, respectively.

Fast forward to the present day. Prosecuting local collaborators for crimes committed at Liberation emerged as a central campaign pledge of the Awami League and now-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed during the 2008 elections when the Awami League “Grand Alliance” emerged triumphant. The law was not invoked until 2010 when authorities arrested four leading politicians from the rival Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-Islami. Jamaat-e-Islami had been banned from political participation following the 1971 war of independence, and its leaders went into exile in Pakistan. The ban was eventually lifted. The party revived, was mainstreamed, and eventually joined in multiparty alliances with, most prominently, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It is now the principal Islamist political party in Bangladesh and a key opponent to the majority Awami League. The most recent general elections were held on January 5, 2014. Jamaat-e-Islami was barred from participating, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and other opposition parties chose to boycott the elections. As a result, 154 of 300 seats went uncontested, so Awami League candidates won by default. The rise of the Awami League, and the marginalization of any credible political opposition, has cleared the way for the government to launch targeted prosecutions against key political opponents under the 1973 Act.

Once prosecuting political opponents became policy, Parliament amended the 1973 Act several times to make it operational. The legislation, which mostly incorporates the Nuremberg/Tokyo definitions of the crimes and benefited from the assistance of international law experts, was quite forward leaning for its time in terms of substantive law. By today’s sensibilities, however, the legislation is outdated and does not reflect recent developments in the law occasioned by the work of the ad hoc criminal tribunals.

The real concerns, however, relate to a number of procedural infirmities contained in the statute itself and in amendments to the Constitution that deny procedural protections to individuals detained or prosecuted under the 1973 Act. For example, 1973 amendments to the Constitution protect the Act from legal attack. Notably, Article 47(3) states:

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces or who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or ever to have become void or unlawful, on the ground that such law or provision of any such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to any of the provisions of this Constitution.

Article 47A also withdrew certain procedural rights from individuals subject to Article 47(3)—including the right to enjoy the protection of the law, the prohibition of ex post facto prosecutions, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.

The legislation itself invalidates additional rights, including the right against self-incrimination (the statute provides that defendants shall not be excused from answering any question on the ground that the response will incriminate the suspect). Long pre-trial detentions have led the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to declare that several defendants hve been subjected to arbitrary detention in violation of international law, notably the ICCPR. In addition, idiosyncratic Rules of Procedure and Evidence govern the Tribunal, so any protections contained in the normal criminal procedure code, including rights of appeal, are inapplicable. For example, the law imposes an obligation on the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court to dispose of any BICT appeal within 60 days—a tall order given that no interlocutory appeals are allowed. In practice, although the accused ostensibly enjoy the right to counsel of their choice, the Bangladesh government and Bar Association have made it virtually impossible for outside counsel to adequately represent their clients by, among other things, restricting their travel to the country and their presence in interrogations. Several trials—including that of Abdul Kalam Azad, the first case to go to verdict—have proceeded in absentia. A U.S. citizen, Ashrafuzzaman Khan, and a U.K. subject, Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin, have also been sentenced to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. Such trials are not, per se, contrary to international law, but defendants must be given a right to a retrial if and when they are apprehended. No defendant in his right mind would appear voluntarily before a tribunal so stacked against him.

Among other retrograde elements, on February 17, 2013, the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act of 2013 amended the law again to allow for the prosecution of “organizations” for their role in the 1971 War of Liberation. (There is some talk that the law may need to be amended anew to enable the prosecution of “parties” in addition to “organizations” if it is to serve its intended purpose). This baldly political move is aimed directly at Jamaat-e-Islami, notwithstanding that its continuity with its liberation-era predecessor is questionable. After the BICT sentenced Abdul Quadar Mollah, the assistant secretary-general of Jamaat-e-Islami, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity in February 2013, the Act was further amended to allow the prosecution to appeal a sentence or a verdict of acquittal. The amendments were made retroactive. On the prosecutor’s appeal, the Supreme Court converted Mollah’s sentence from life imprisonment to death, a final sentence that does not admit the right of judicial appeal. Despite calls on December 11, 2013, from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to Sheikh Hasina herself, Mollah became the first BICT defendant to be executed. He was hanged on December 12, 2013 after a last minute stay of execution was lifted, on the eve of the upcoming Victory Day celebrations. Indeed, trials and appeals proceeded at a breakneck pace in 2013, apparently in an effort to achieve results in advance of the January 2014 elections.

The BICT has also been mired in corruption allegations. In December 2012, The Economist broke the story, based upon leaked emails and recorded Skype conversations, that a BICT judge had been seeking outside advice on how to rule from the Brussels-based director of the Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies, who was also apparently collaborating with the prosecution. The leaked correspondence suggest that the government was pressuring the judges to issue their judgments more quickly. The judge eventually resigned, but the BICT nonetheless responded with threatened contempt of court charges against The Economist’s journalists. Other journalists and media outlets that have been critical of the BICT have also been hit with contempt charges.

Individually, these infirmities are deeply troubling. Collectively, they fundamentally undermine the fairness of the proceedings, especially given that the death penalty is on the table.

The international community initially supported this effort at historical justice, given the longstanding impunity stemming from the war of independence. Human Rights Watch, for example, called the trials an important and long overdue step to achieve justice for victims. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offered assistance, and the European Union passed resolutions supporting the trials. However, this support soon soured when it was clear that the process had been corrupted and was more political than legal.

The United States’ position toward the BICT has been a guarded one. While acknowledging the need to address the atrocities committed during the war, the United States has also called for proceedings to be free, fair, transparent, and consistent with international and domestic due process standards. The United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp (my former boss), has visited Bangladesh five times (most recently in August 2014) in an effort to bring the proceedings better into line with international standards. Before the trials began, he wrote an extensive analysis of the original legislation, which was later leaked to the press, setting forth his concerns and suggestions for improvements. He was later criticized for offering his views, even though they had been solicited by Bangladesh. Some of these suggestions—including the recognition of res judicata and double jeopardy, the right to a fair and public hearing with counsel of the defendant’s choice, placing the burden of proof on the prosecution, and establishing a system of witness protection—were at least partially implemented. Others—having to do with interlocutory appeals, interrogation rights, disclosure obligations on the prosecution, and enabling the participation of foreign lawyers in court—were disregarded. Now that proceedings are fully underway, the prospects of genuine legal reform are dim. The goal now seems to be to keep the defendants alive.

And What of the Birangonas?

The suffering of Bangladesh’s rape victims continues. Indeed, these women were twice made the victim. The first breach of their rights and dignity occurred when they were subjected to mass rape on a staggering scale. Although we will never have accurate numbers, all accounts suggest that tens of thousands of women were systematically kidnapped, raped, and mutilated.  Many did not survive their ordeal.  Those who did suffered a second kind of assault in the aftermath of the war. Rather than being treated with compassion, given medical and psychological assistance, receiving reparations, or getting access to meaningful justice, many survivors were instead silenced, ostracized by their families, and treated as pariahs in their own communities. The only medical services on offer were makeshift abortion clinics staffed by experts who were flown in to conduct late-term abortions. Many “war babies” who were not aborted were put up for international adoption. For many women, the only tangible recognition they received for what they had suffered were the plaques eventually bestowed on them. Although labeled “Birangonas” (war heroines), this supposed honorific turned out to be little more than a cruel hypocrisy. Many survivors continue to live in poverty and shame.

The propaganda value of violence against women has long been recognized. There is now the risk that these women—who for years have been hidden away, ignored, ostracized or worse—will be injured a third time when their legitimate claims for justice will be used to justify a deeply illegitimate process.  They will be trotted out in support of the trials under the illusion that their stories matter. Once the victims have played their part in justifying a flawed process, they will be relegated back to the shadows once again. As criticism mounts about the BICT, Bangladesh’s Birangonas will come to realize that offering them the opportunity to achieve justice for what befell them was never the goal.

UN Special Rapporteur, Rashida Manjoo, will moderate a Panel Discussion & Deliver a Keynote Address at the University of Chicago Law School

/ Sital Kalantry / Leave a comment

You are invited to attend a panel discussion on Tuesday, May 14 from 12:15 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. in Chicago on the occasion of the public launch of a report, Women in Prison in Argentina: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences, written by Cornell Law School’s Avon Global Center for Women & Justice and International Human Rights Clinic, the Defensoría General de la Nación Argentina (Public Defender), and the University of Chicago International Human Rights Clinic.  The Report relies on empirical data from a survey developed by the authors of the Report and randomly administered to nearly 30% of all women prisoners in federal prisons in Argentina.

There has been an increase in the rate of women’s imprisonment in many countries around the world. Yet many countries fail to adequately address the unique issues raised when women are deprived of their liberty. The panelists will discuss the causes of the increase in rates of imprisonment, including the global war on drugs and drug use. They will also address the conditions of women’s imprisonment, such as lack of gender-specific healthcare, shackling during childbirth, and sexual violence in prisons. The increase in women’s imprisonment impacts children and families. The increase in women’s imprisonment impacts children and families.  To address this, some countries such as Argentina have prisons where children up to 4 years old can live with their mothers.  What are the benefits and challenges of this? What are the alternatives to this?  The panel will discuss issues relating to women’s imprisonment from an international and comparative perspective.  What can countries learn from each other’s practices?  To what extent are the Bangkok Rules recently adopted by the UN being implemented in women’s prisons around the world? The findings and recommendations from Report on Argentina will also be discussed.    

Moderator: Rashida Manjoo, UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences

Speakers:

• Mikhail Golichenko, Senior Policy Analyst, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network

• Andrea Huber, Policy Director, Penal Reform International (London)

• Sital Kalantry, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the International Human Rights Clinic, University of Chicago Law School

• Silvia Martinez, Director of the Prison Commission of the Public Defender’s Office in Argentina

• Gail Smith, Founder and Senior Policy Director, Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers.

Student speakers: Jullia Park, J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Chicago Law School and Jamie Stinson, J.D. Candidate 2014, Cornell Law School

The venue is Room III at the University of Chicago Law School, 1111 East 60th Street, Chicago.  Open to the public and lunch will be provided but seats are limited.    

For special assistance or needs, please contact Aican Nguyen at 773.702.0184Image