The Quest For Gender Based Asylum: Exploring ‘Women’ as a Particular Social Group

The United Nations Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, 1951(‘Convention’) is the centerpiece of international refugee protection that provides protection to individuals who are forced to flee their homes due to a well-founded fear of persecution. The United States of America (‘US’), one of the treaty’s signatories, has adopted Article 1(A) of the Convention without any substantial reservation, understanding or declaration (‘RUDs’). Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952(‘INA’) grants asylum if an alien is unable or unwilling to return to his/her country of origin because s/he has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ 

Notably, both the Convention and the INA leave out ‘gender’ as a ground for persecution. However, this has not stopped women from making claims of asylum on the basis of their gender. In fact, the US records a 30-year-long quest in establishing gender as a protected category in asylum law. In the recent decision of Jaceyls Miguelina de Pena-Paniagua v. William P. Barr (‘De Pena’) the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized gender as a legal basis for granting asylum, allowing the US to finally become a safe haven for women fleeing domestic violence. The Harvard Immigration and Refugee clinic that represented the asylee, a Dominican woman escaping domestic and sexual violence, expressed that the Judge saw domestic violence for what it was–persecution for her gender, and that the decision has finally put gender on par with other grounds for asylum. 

Persecution of Women 

In order to obtain asylum, an asylum-seeker must prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The term ‘persecution’ has not been defined in the INA or Convention. There is no universally accepted definition of persecution, however most acts of bodily violence have been recognised as such. The Board of Immigration Appeals (‘BIA’) has defined persecution as a ‘threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.’[i]

While considering the case for women, instances of persecution can be split into two categories:

  1. The firstkind occurs within private spheres, where the persecutor is generally an individual who shares an intimate relationship with the woman, such as a romantic partner or relative. This include acts of sexual/domestic violence, economic/emotional abuse, or regressive cultural practices such as female genital mutilation, honour killings, etc. 
  2. The secondkind is where the persecution is carried out or condoned by a public or private, non-state actor, such as Governments, or militant groupswho specifically subject women of an  ethnicity to sexual violence or subjugation. This category encompasses forced population control strategies, penalties that restrict women’s reproductive freedoms, sexual assault, rape, trafficking, forced marriages, etc. 

Evidently, in both categories, women are persecuted because of their gender and their particular societal status as women.  If persecution is studied as a means of exerting control over a race, religion or particular social group, it is clear that women fit this bill.

Additionally, the asylum-seeker must also prove that she is unable or unwilling to return to, or is unable to avail protection from persecution in, her home country. Interestingly, in most cases of persecution of women, the government and the law enforcement are unresponsive to domestic violence or sexual violence, and in some cases, are even responsible for it. 

Women as a Particular Social Group 

Defining a PSG is extremely important because, depending on how narrowly or broadly it is construed, it can result in vast differences in who is granted asylum. The UNHCR Executive Committee in 1985 recognised that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society may be considered as a PSG. In 1991, the UNHCR issued guidelines on the protection of refugee women in which it reiterated the same principle. The US BIA also has provided some guidance on the matter. In the Matter of Acosta, the BIA recognised that a PSG should share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex. It is relevant to note that sex and gender are conflated in refugee law. However one can argue that gender is also an ‘immutable characteristic’, as it fundamental to an individual’s identity or conscience. Later, ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ were identified as additional factors for PSGs. 

The issue that women face while claiming membership to a PSG is that they have to prove the group’s constitution, characteristics and then establish that they fit the set criteria. This double liability makes it harder for women to seek asylum. While certain women have been successful in making a claim for asylum in the US – women who refuse to undergo the process of female genital mutilation, and victims of domestic violence, there are still gaps that can only be filled by classifying ‘women’ as an independent PSG. 

Case for the wider group of ‘women’

The decision of the First Circuit in De Pena makes an effort to classify women as a PSG. While the asylee only made a case of belonging to the PSG of Dominican women who were unable to leave or escape a domestic relationship, the court positively considered and advocated for the wider category of ‘women’ to be classified as a PSG.

The main objection in construing ‘women’ as a PSG, is that it encompasses a large number of people and this will open floodgates to a large number of women seeking asylum.[ii]But in De Pena, the court acknowledged the view of Perdomo v. Holder that if race, religion and nationality refer to large classes of persons, PSGs may do as well as they are equally based on innate characteristics. Therefore a PSG cannot be rejected because it represents too large a portion of the population as this would misunderstand the function of the protected categories. Gender, like all other grounds, only functions to recognise the reason an individual is persecuted and does not imply anything larger.[iii]

While US asylum law only recently has recognized gender as a protected status, other countries set a good example for the way forward. In 1993, the Immigration and Refugee board of Canada released guidelines for gender-related persecution. Interestingly, this has not led to an explosion of claims. Further, in 2006, the House of Lords recognized that gender alone may fall within the definition of a PSG. Such definitive cases and specific guidelines aid the cause of women asylum seekers, and go a long way in recognizing the case for women as a particular social group. 


[i]Hernandez- Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985); Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986).

[ii]Andrea Binder, Gender and the Membership in a Particular Social Group Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 167 (2001), p 191.

[iii]Andrea Binder, Gender and the Membership in a Particular Social Group Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 167 (2001), p 191.

The Right to Seek and Enjoy Asylum During COVID-19

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A Syrian boy poses for a picture during an awareness workshop on Coronavirus (COVID-19) held by Doctor Ali Ghazal at a camp for displaced people in Atme town in Syria’s northwestern Idlib province, near the border with Turkey, on March 14, 2020. (Photo by AAREF WATAD / AFP)

In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, “[i]f ever we needed reminding that we live in an interconnected world, the novel coronavirus has brought that home.” Though it is a problem common to all of us, the suffering is disproportionately more for the world’s most vulnerable groups, including refugees and asylum-seekers. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by State practices limiting asylum as a response to the pandemic. Though public health emergencies allow States to impose certain limitations, this must be done in compliance with States’ relevant obligations under international law. This post provides a short overview of the most basic but key protections afforded to asylum-seekers and refugees under international law.

Though there is no internationally agreed upon legal definition of asylum, the UNHCR defines it as a process starting with safe admission into a territory and concluding with durable solutions, i.e., voluntary return in safety and dignity, local integration, or resettlement to another location or country. “Asylum-seeker” refers to individuals who are seeking international protection and have not yet been granted asylum by the receiving State. “Refugee” refers to someone who has left their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return because of a serious threat to their life or freedom on the grounds listed under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Other regional instruments may provide different definitions to include other grounds for refugee status, such as a “massive violation of human rights” (e.g., the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees). Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker. In that regard, at the international level, refugee status entitles those who satisfy that criteria to a specific set of protective regimes laid out in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. However, asylum-seekers are still entitled to certain protections in compliance with the receiving State’s obligations under international law, regardless of being recognized as a refugee.

The right to seek and enjoy asylum is enshrined in various international and regional instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The UNHCR interprets the right to asylum to include respect for the principle of non-refoulement, admission to the territories of States, and being treated in compliance with the respective human rights and refugee law standards. Individuals seeking international protection would benefit from the human rights obligations that a State owes to its citizens without any discrimination.

But what are the main parameters of such protection during a pandemic?

The recently issued Human Mobility and Human Rights in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees, and Other Displaced Persons developed by a committee of established experts and practitioners, and endorsed by a 1,000 international experts, lays out 14 key principles applicable to all persons, irrespective of their immigration status. These principles are developed to elucidate the scope of relevant human rights obligations during emergencies as States and other relevant stakeholders navigate the pandemic response.

In the same vein, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR (adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council and UN Human Rights Committee general comments on states of emergency and freedom of movement), provide complimentary guidance as they are critical in implementing the scope of limitations to human rights in public health and national emergency situations. The Siracusa Principles highlight that such limitation must be based on one of the grounds recognized by the relevant article; respond to a pressing public or social need; pursue a legitimate aim; and be proportionate to that aim (Principle 10). Any derogation measure must be “strictly necessary to deal with the threat and proportionate to its nature and extent” (Principle 39). Additionally, certain rights are non-derogable even in the events of public emergency, including the right to life and freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or punishment among others.

In light of the above, key principles pertaining to States’ treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees in a pandemic can be listed as follows:

Non-refoulement

The prohibition of return (to a real risk of persecution, arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment) cannot be derogated from, even during a public health emergency. The cornerstone principle guaranteeing the right to seek and enjoy asylum is the principle of non-refoulement set forth under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which prohibits States from expelling or returning refugees “in any manner . . . where his life or freedom would be threatened.” The principle applies not only to removal, but also to refusal of entry. It applies to all refugees – even if their status has not been officially determined. The prohibition has attained the status of customary international law and is considered a jus cogens norm.

As the UNHCR clarified in its recent guidance on COVID-19 responses, imposing blanket measures to prevent refugees or asylum-seekers from admission or discriminating against certain nationals without demonstrating relevant evidence of a health risk or putting in place measures to protect against refoulement would violate the prohibition. However, in the US, the Department of Health and Human Services has implemented an order to suspend the introduction of persons into the US from certain countries and requiring their immediate repatriation. Belgium and the Netherlands have also suspended the right to asylum for newly arriving asylum-seekers due to COVID-19 despite the guidance from the European Commission stating that even though national authorities may take necessary measures to contain further spread of the pandemic, such measures should be implemented in a non-discriminatory way taking into account the principle of non-refoulement and obligations under international law. Closing borders altogether in these manners violates the principle of non-refoulement affecting the right to seek and enjoy asylum.

Measures on asylum-seekers upon entry

In all cases, non-discrimination, human rights, and dignity of all travelers must be respected. Relevant WHO regulations are given particular weight in the context of a limitation imposed on the ground of public health (Siracusa Principles, Principle 26). As defined by the WHO’s International Health Regulations, countries may impose relevant measures during pandemics as long as they are non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, and proportionate. Similarly, medical examinations and other measures may be implemented for “travelers” (“a natural person undertaking an international voyage”) at ports of entry, but these measures cannot be “invasive.” Similarly, Article 13 of the EU Reception Conditions Directive lays out that EU Member States may proceed to a medical screening of applicants for international protection on public health grounds while such medical screening must comply with fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality, necessity, and non-discrimination. Furthermore, Article 19 of the Directive requires that applicants receive “the necessary health care, which shall include, at least, emergency care and essential treatment of illnesses and of serious mental disorders.” The European Commission specified that such health care would also include relevant treatment for COVID-19.

Non-discrimination

Lack of effective realization of non-discrimination undermines the right to asylum. Core international human rights treaties prohibit “discrimination of any kind” viz. refugees and asylum-seekers. In practice, however, migrants are less likely to benefit from relevant health and financial services due to lack of legal status and access to services. Moreover, migrants are often stigmatized and blamed for spreading viruses. In other cases, COVID-19 measures are applied in discriminatory manners as seen in Lebanon, where curfews have been applied more stringently towards Syrian refugees.

Equal treatment and non-discrimination with regards to the right to health are especially crucial in the context of COVID-19. As part of the right to health, States must provide access to food, water, sanitation, and shelter to all persons (UDHR Art. 25 and ICESCR Art. 12 in particular). States must refrain from practices reinforcing stigma and xenophobia and implement public health responses inclusive of all marginalized groups (see, in particular, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Arts. 1.1, 2, 4; CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 30; and 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 3).

Detention

Detention is a practical impediment to the implementation of the right to asylum. The UNHCR guidelines on the issue establish that a period of confinement may be imposed legitimately as a preventive measure in the event of a pandemic but that such confinement should be limited to its purpose and cease as soon as the necessary testing or treatment is complete. Detention must always be an exceptional measure of last resort and conducted in accordance with the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Alternatives to detention should be considered, including regular reporting requirements, particularly when vulnerable groups are concerned. Human Rights Watch recently reported the arbitrary detention of nearly 2,000 migrants and asylum-seekers in Greece – including vulnerable groups like children, persons with disabilities, and pregnant women.

Detention constitutes a significant risk factor for contagious spread during a pandemic. Such detained people are highly vulnerable to the spread of COVID-19 mostly due to the inadequacy of detention conditions, overcrowding, limited supplies for personal cleaning, limited personal protective equipment such as masks and gloves, and poor access to health care. Detention of displaced persons is not permissible when such detentions pose serious threats to their health and life due to COVID-19. In addition to the adverse risks and impacts to the right to life and health, COVID-19 causes risk of indefinite detention as these people are neither admitted nor provided the option to return due to border closures.

Conclusion

Amidst a global pandemic, adhering to basic principles of international law vis-à-vis asylum seekers and refugees is vital. States cannot impose blanket measures banning asylum seekers and refugees from seeking and enjoying international protection and relevant considerations pertaining to immigration detention that are altogether key to the reinforcement of the right to seek and enjoy asylum. These principles impose clear obligations on States that they cannot simply choose to ignore during health emergencies – even global pandemics.

*This article reflects the personal views of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank.

Nationwide Class Action in the U.S. Protects the Right to Seek Asylum

A Seattle-based federal court has stepped in to protect the right to seek asylum, deciding in favor of a nationwide class constituting thousands of asylum-seekers in a case with important implications for the Trump administration’s recently-announced quota policy for U.S. Immigration Courts. On March 29, 2018, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez issued an 18-page order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in the Mendez Rojas v. DHS case. Judge Martinez’s forceful decision shores up the due process rights of asylum-seekers under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and statutory rights grounded in the federal Immigration and Naturalization Act and Administrative Procedure Act, as well as protections enshrined in international refugee law more broadly.

The named plaintiffs in the suit are asylum seekers from Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. Collectively, they stand in for two classes of individuals certified by the Court last year, those who declared a fear of return to their home countries and have undergone a credible fear interview and been released to pursue their asylum claims, and, second, those released without first undergoing the credible fear interview. None of the named plaintiffs received notice of the one-year filing deadline or a meaningful mechanism to timely file their asylum applications. Asylum seekers must file their asylum applications within one year in order to receive asylum protection.

The class action lawsuit, brought by counsel from the American Immigration Council, Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, and Dobrin & Han, PC, included asylum seekers released from detention who are in removal proceedings in immigration court and who have yet to be placed into removal proceedings and who were not given notice of the one-year filing deadline to apply for asylum.

The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the lack of notice to asylum seekers violates the congressional intent behind the one-year filing deadline. Created by Congress in 1996, the one-year filing deadline was ostensibly designed to guard against fraudulent asylum claims. The law’s most ardent supporters, however, made clear that the implementation of the deadline should not impede protection for genuine asylum-seekers. During discussions on the Senate floor, for instance, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stated:

Like you, I am committed to ensuring that those with legitimate claims of asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for technical deficiencies. If the time limit is not implemented fairly, or cannot be implemented fairly, I will be prepared to revisit this issue in a later Congress.

The Court also relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, specifically Mullanenoting that procedural due process requires that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” In this case, the Court found that the publically available DHS documents discussing the one-year filing deadline were not reasonably calculated to provide adequate notice to the asylum-seeking plaintiffs. The Court note that some of the asylum seekers in the class believed they had actually applied for asylum by virtue of undergoing a credible fear interview, in which they explained their fear of return to their home country in great detail to a USCIS asylum officer.

The Court also highlighted the problems caused by informing someone that they will be instructed on how to apply for asylum in court in the future, while the court dates referenced often take place well beyond the one-year filing deadline imposed. My 2016 article in the Wisconsin Law Reviewexamines the problems at the intersection of our burgeoning immigration court backlog and the one-year filing deadline in greater detail.

Judge Martinez signaled his sympathy regarding the extreme vulnerability of asylum-seekers, grounding his decision in the fact that “many class members have suffered severe trauma, do not speak English, are unfamiliar with the United States’ complicated immigration legal system, and do not have access to counsel.”He went on to conclude that DHS’ failure to provide adequate notice is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Responding to DHS’ argument that the Court owed deference to agency “procedure,” the Court stated simply, “no deference is owed to procedures that violate a statute or the Constitution.” Currently, there is a ping pong back and forth between the agencies overseeing the asylum process. Until a Notice to Appear is filed with U.S. Immigration Court, the court will not accept an asylum application. If a case appears likely to be headed for a court appearance, however, USCIS, which includes the asylum office, routinely denies jurisdiction. There is currently no actual deadline for ICE to file a Notice to Appear with immigration court, leaving asylum-seekers and attorneys in limbo and unable to meet the deadline–a “technical deficiency” in the purest sense.

Importantly, while declining to reach the constitutional argument for a meaningful application mechanism, the Court found that defendants’ failure to provide a uniform mechanism by which an asylum-seeker could actually timely apply for asylum, assuming she gained knowledge of the deadline, violated the asylum statute and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court concluded by ordering DHS to provide notice of the one-year filing deadline to class members who have already been released. Further, Judge Martinez ordered that DHS give notice to future asylum-seekers prior to or at the time of release them from detention. DHS is also required to adopt and publicize uniform procedural mechanisms to ensure class members can timely file their asylum applications. Implementation and the reception from immigration judges nationwide to the decision remains to be seen. Already, advocates shared a report of a judge at the Arlington immigration court refusing to enter the Mendez Rojas decision into the record because he stated that the Executive Office for Immigration Review is not bound by the Administrative Procedure Act.

Assuming implementation is successful, this decision represents a win for asylum-seekers and brings greater clarity and organization to an already-overwhelmed and backlogged immigration court system. Judge Martinez’s order represents yet another instance in which the federal courts have intervened in administrative confusion to ensure constitutional due process and justice for immigrants. The decision is a step forward in upholding American values and adhering to our domestic and international legal obligations to protect refugees from return to countries where they would face a threat to their life or freedom.

Committee against Torture Weighs in on U.S. Immigration Policy

U.S. Presentation Before the Committee Against Torture (US Mission Photo / Eric Bridiers)

U.S. Presentation Before the Committee Against Torture (U.S. Mission Photo / Eric Bridiers)

 

By  Kelleen Corrigan and Lia Lindsey

Last month the Committee against Torture (“Committee”) reviewed the United States’ compliance with its obligations under the Convention against Torture (“Convention”).  Over the course of three days in Geneva, the Committee consulted with key stakeholders—including affected individuals, civil society representatives, and the U.S. government delegation—to gain insight into the United States’ adherence to its responsibilities under the Convention.  The Committee raised many issues of concern, including police brutality, applicability of the Convention to individuals at Guantanamo Bay and other detention sites, and prison conditions, as well as asylum procedures and the detention of immigrants.

As co-chairs of the Immigration Detention and Deportation Working Group with the U.S. Human Rights Network Convention against Torture Taskforce, we attended the sessions in Geneva to ensure the Committee was fully briefed on the intersection of Convention obligations and treatment of immigrants in the United States.  Prior to the review, our working group coordinated a joint shadow report.  The report, submitted to the Committee and the U.S. government, provided significant background information and case examples, as well as recommendations and questions for the Committee to pose to the U.S. delegates.

Our working group also delivered an oral statement to the Committee highlighting the most distressing abuses, specifically the increased reliance on expedited removal procedures which may result in refoulement and other rights violations; the lack of codified and binding regulations for detention facilities; serious conditions issues and abuse in detention; as well as concerns about the general overuse of detention and the lack of utilization of community-based alternatives.  We also provided additional information and examples to members of the Committee during subsequent informal gatherings.

The Concluding Observations released on November 28, two weeks after the review, reflect the Committee’s awareness and concerns about the serious shortcomings of the United States in regards to its treatment of non-citizens.  In the Concluding Observations, the Committee generally categorized its main concerns about issues affecting non-citizens into two areas:  (1) the use of expedited removal procedures and other summary processes; and (2) immigration detention.

Regarding expedited processes, the members addressed apprehension about the United States’ treatment of non-citizens along the southern U.S. border.  The Committee noted increasing reports that Customs and Border Protection personnel are not identifying or referring immigrants for asylum screening interviews as required.

As a result of inadequate screening and expedited removal processes, some asylum seekers are returned to their country of origin without access to asylum procedures.  Thus, the Committee took a critical eye to the potential of non-refoulment and made recommendations in line with assuring international protection.  These included that the United States should “review the use of expedited removals,” “guarantee access to attorneys,” and to increase its risk assessment particularly regarding individuals from Mexico and northern Central America. Continue reading

Australia’s Increasingly Restrictive Policies Block Asylum Seekers From Entry

Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, recently announced a strict new policy mandating that all asylum seekers arriving by boat would be sent to a refugee-processing center in Papua New Guinea. This policy change has been covered widely in the media, through the New York Times, the BBC, and other news outlets. According to the Australian Prime Minister’s announcement, asylum seekers, by arriving by boat without a valid visa, will forfeit any right to claim asylum in Australia. Rather, if an asylum seeker is determined to have a genuine claim to refugee status, she will be resettled in Papua New Guinea. Australia is, of course, a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. While this development is disheartening, it is not shocking given the political arena and the long history of restrictive asylum policies in Australia. Australia’s policies with regards to asylum seekers arriving by sea have long been controversial. In August 2001, Australia turned away a Norwegian vessel in distress carrying over 400 asylum seekers, focusing international attention on the intersection of maritime rescue law and refugee law. For coverage of this incident and in depth coverage on related issues, see Professor Niels W. Frenzen’s Migrants at Sea blog. Amnesty International’s Australia Chapter also provides regular reports and coverage on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in Australia.

Australia is, of course, is only one of several countries to turn away asylum seekers arriving by sea. Indeed, the United States also participates in interdiction at sea. In fact, our own Supreme Court explicitly found this practice to be in line with our international obligations even where, in that case, the US was interdicting Haitians and returning them to the country of feared persecution. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Whether Australia’s evolving interdiction policy will be judged by its own courts remains to be seen.

Snowden’s asylum case: Be careful what you ask for

According to recwhistleent news reports, Edward Snowden, the whistleblower who leaked documents revealing the scope of the National Security Agency’s surveillance program, has applied for political asylum in at least twenty-one countries.  Though his applications have not been made public, Snowden has received at least three offers of asylum: from Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.  The proffered grounds for these asylum grants have varied from Bolivian President Evo Morales, who presented it as a “fair protest” for preventing his presidential airplane from entering the airspace of several European countries; to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who saw a need to protect “the young American” against “persecution from the empire“; to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who remained vague on the details

None of these explanations bears much relation to international refugee law, which, though rarely an arm’s length from politics, does require some rigorous legal analysis.  To be fair, each country has the right to grant asylum based on their own domestic law, which may be more generous than international refugee law standards.  (Though the terms “asylum” and “refugee status” are often used interchangeably, in the United States, the former technically refers to domestic law and the latter to international law.)  But given the legitimacy that the international legal standards might afford a claim like Snowden’s, it’s worth attempting a more thorough analysis of his asylum claim. Continue reading