Write On! Call for Papers: Colonial Law Conference, Helsinki (deadline March 1)

eci20ryhmakuva-7-349pxThe Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Helsinki has announced a call for papers for the Conference “Law Between Global and Colonial: Techniques of Empire,” to be held from 3-5 October 2016.

The conference proposes to discuss the legal languages and techniques through which colonial powers ruled non-European territories and populations throughout the modern age. The aim of the conference is to examine in detail the juridical practices and discourses of colonial powers when they exercised their supremacy over colonial subjects and disciplined them. Although the focus of the conference is historical, its theme resonates in the present. With the great numbers of people moving about in Europe, Asia and Africa as migrants, guest workers, refugees and displaced persons, territorial states have often used methods and techniques that resemble those with which colonial populations once were treated. With research showing a sharp rise in world inequality, the conference poses the question whether legislative techniques and institutions inherited from the imperial past, once again see the light of day in the present.

The conference will close the four and a half-year period of the Finnish Academy research project on “International Law, Religion and Empire” at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki. Members: Martti Koskenniemi, Paolo Amorosa, Mónica García-Salmones, Manuel Jimenez and Walter Rech.

Abstracts are due by March 1. For more information, see the full Call for Papers at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Events/Call_for_Papers_Colonial_Law_2016.pdf.

 

It’s in the name: reading the nuclear agreement as a shift in power in favor of Europe

P5+1 or EU3+3?
Initially referred to as P5+1, especially by the US, the name used about the Iran nuclear negotiations signaled that this was an agreement with all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany on the same side, trying to reach a deal with Iran. The British, however, have for a long time referred to the negotiations as EU3+3, signaling something significantly different- the European countries plus EU on one side, and the US, China and Russia on the other side. This is a detail, and an important one. It signals a divided interest, where Europe sees itself as one party, with its own interests against the other parties to the deal. In the end Europe got its will. The final text of the agreement consistently refers to E3/EU+3.
What does this imply? Setting aside the nuclear issue which is what the agreement explicitly deals with, the agreement is at the same time a deal between the great powers about the balance of power in the region and beyond. Consider the parties: China, Russia, the US, the UK, Germany, France and the EU. All powerful actors, and all historically and presently in tension with each other, not just in the Middle East but also in countries such as Ukraine, Syria, and Israel/Palestine. While the deal establishes a certain order between these actors, particularly between the US and Europe, it also establishes a power balance in Europe’s favor. Europe is not only more strongly represented in the deal – with three independent members (Germany, the UK and France), but the EU as a union has performed the important role as facilitator for the negotiations and for the final deal. It will particularly be interesting to see what this implies for the relationship between the US and Europe, considering that the Middle East has long been a source of transatlantic tension between them about both policy and influence. During the Cold War the common red enemy and the American hegemony in the region left little space for tensions to have significant consequences.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall Europe has made a comeback in the region. Not only did the end of the Cold War mark an end to the US’ hegemony in the region, it also created a void to be filled- and this void has for a while now been dominated by an anarchy-like tension between all powers who are also parties to this deal. Europe now seems to succeed in its aspirations as a superpower. This has partly to do with the EU itself, which has put more emphasis on the union’s geopolitical aspirations beyond Europe. The catastrophic failure in Iraq has also had the US acknowledge and invite European involvement in the region. It remains to be seen how this involvement will play out, and how the differences within the EU will influence its policy making in the region.

Write On! Call for Papers: Palestine Yearbook of International Law (deadline 15 February)

birzeitThe Palestine Yearbook of International Law is now inviting submissions of scholarly articles for publication for its next volume, XVIII (2015). Unlike recent years, this upcoming volume will not be based on a specific theme. Therefore, the editors encourage the submission of scholarly pieces of relevance to public international law and Palestine. The Yearbook is edited at Birzeit University’s Institute of Law (Birzeit, Palestine), and published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (The Hague, The Netherlands). The Editor-in-Chief of the Yearbook is Mr. Ardi Imseis.

At this stage, the Institute of Law will be accepting abstracts for review. Abstracts should include a working title, with a preliminary outline of the author’s legal arguments, along with a CV.

Recommended topics include, but are not limited to:

  • Comparative legal analyses of human rights and freedom struggles of relevance to Palestine (e.g. East Timor, Northern Ireland, South Africa, United States, etc.);
  • Non-State actors, national liberation movements and international law;
  • Contemporary developments and gaps in the international humanitarian and human rights law framework;
  • The role and utility of continuing to use the United Nations (the General Assembly, Security Council, International Court of Justice, etc.) in advancing the cause of peace, justice and freedom in Palestine;
  • The statehood of Palestine and its implications in law and policy, both in the region and beyond;
  • The responsibility of States (including third States) international organizations, corporations and/or individuals in international law;
  • The continued relevance of the Oslo Accords under international law, and in light of Palestine’s accession to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
  • The Gaza Strip and international law;
  • Litigating the Palestine issue, at the domestic and international levels;
  • Apartheid and colonialism in international law;
  • Natural resources in international law;
  • Self-determination of peoples in international law;
  • Humanitarian intervention;
  • The Syria crisis in international law (international refugee law, international humanitarian law, etc…);
  • Palestine’s accessions to international treaties and the possibility of future accessions and the joining of international organizations.

Important dates and contact information:

Prospective authors should express interest by e-mailing the Assistant Editor of the Yearbook, Ms. Reem Al-Botmeh and sending an abstract of the suggested paper as indicated above, along with the prospective author’s CV.

The abstract of under 750 words should be submitted by 15 February 2015.

Notification of decisions will be provided 1 March 2015.

Contact Information:

For more information, please contact Ms. Reem Al-Botmeh, the Assistant Editor of the Yearbook, at rbotmeh@gmail.com or alternatively, you may communicate directly with Mr. Ardi Imseis at ai295@cam.ac.uk.

Write On! Legalities and Legacies: The Past, Present, and Future of the Palestine Mandate in International Law

(Photo Credit: Premasagar Rose)

 

The Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Columbia Law School invite the submission of written proposals for an international conference on the international law legacies of the Palestine mandate, to be held in Jerusalem on 21-22 June 2015, and for subsequent publication. From their call for papers:

Recipients of this call for papers are invited to submit proposals to present a paper at the conference. Some authors of proposals selected for the conference will be offered partial or full coverage of flight and accommodation expenses.

IMPORTANT DATES

Deadline for Submitting 1-2 Page Proposal: 30 September 2014

Deadline for Submitting the Article (Selected Proposals): 15 April 2015

BACKGROUND

On 24 July 1922, the Council of the League of Nations confirmed the mandate for Palestine. On midnight, 14 May 1948, the mandate came to an end. Much that happened before, during and beyond these dates remain contested – and much remains uncharted.

This is particularly patent when it comes to the international legal aspects of the Palestine mandate. Conflict historians have long been captivated by that period; historians of Israeli law have focused on the law of mandatory Palestine for some time now. Yet, since the 1940s, little to none of that attention has been turned to the role international law has played in the Palestine mandate, or the role of the Palestine mandate in affecting the course of international law. International law practitioners, scholars, and historians, it seems, are occasionally willing to reengage with some of the old debates surrounding the Palestine mandate (such as the locus of sovereignty in mandate territories), as has the International Court of Justice in the Wall Advisory Opinion. Seldom do they engage in a broader reflection on the legal import of the Palestine mandate or on its legacies. The conference seeks to ponder on and rectify this glaring gap. By focusing on legalities and legacies of the Palestine mandate in international law, we intend to explore whether, today, there is more to the Palestine mandate than a crucial or futile contestation – legal or political (In 1925, the Supreme Court of Palestine, sitting as a High Court of Justice, entertained the view that the mandate was ‘a political and not a legal document … likely to contain expressions of good intention which are more easy to write than to read’)? – over historic rights, entitlements, and narratives. A convenient point of departure may be the League of Nations mandate system. Here, renewed interest by international legal and diplomatic historians could furnish fresh perspectives on how the mandate system, and the Palestine mandate, were conceived, enacted, theorized, practiced, and terminated. Equally, the Palestine and other mandates can provide new vantage points from which to gauge contemporary international law debates (e.g. the termination of belligerent occupation by fiat of an international organization resolution, or the legal framework(s) governing post-conflict governance and territorial administration.

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Go On! Registration ends 12 Sept. for Institute for Global Law and Policy 2015 Workshop in Doha, Qatar

The Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) at Harvard Law School invites you to apply to participate in its 2015 Workshop in Doha, Qatar, from January 2-11, 2015:

At the 2015 Workshop (January 2-11) we will continue to seek ways to deepen the network of collaboration among our Workshop alumni as well as continue to strengthen and renew our core program with new themes and new participants. Our aim is to build on the momentum of our first five Workshops as we strive to develop the premier site for networked innovation in the fields of global governance and economic policy among young scholars and policymakers from across the world. The full program for the 2015 IGLP Workshop, including Workshop Streams, will be announced soon.

IGLP: The Workshop is an intensive residential program designed for doctoral and post-doctoral scholars and junior faculty. This initiative aims to promote innovative ideas and alternative approaches to issues of global law, economic policy, and social justice in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Our aim is to strengthen the next generation of scholars by placing them in collaboration with their global peers as they develop innovative ideas and alternative approaches to issues of global law, economic policy, social justice and governance.

The IGLP is pleased to announce that we are currently accepting Participant applications for the 2015 IGLP Workshop, which will be held in Doha, during the first week of January 2015. We particularly encourage those who have not previously participated in the IGLP Workshop to apply as Participants.

The application deadline for the 2015 IGLP Participant application is September 12, 2014Click HERE to apply. 

To learn more, visit: http://www.harvardiglp.org/iglp-the-workshop/

Security Council Resolution 2170 against the world’s richest terrorist organization

On 15 August 2014, about a week prior to harsh criticism from the outgoing UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay ( available here ) for its lack of responsiveness, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2170 in response to the terrorist activities of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) and the Al Nusrah Fron (ANF) as well as other entities associated with Al-Qaida.

This resolution imposes three main duties on all states:

1. Action against the export of terrorist fighters

2. Action against the financing of terrorism

3. Sanctions

The first action consists of four sub-duties. Firstly, the duty of all states to take national measures to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to IS, ANF and connected entities. According to existing estimates, most fighters are foreign- many from Europe, from neighbouring countries and from as far as Indonesia and Chechnya. Secondly, the resolution imposes a duty to bring such individuals to justice. Thirdly, a duty to discourage individuals who are at risk of recruitment and violent radicalization to travel to Syria and Iraq for the purposes of supporting or fighting for IS and ANF. And finally, a duty to prevent direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer to IS, ANF and other individuals and groups associated with Al-Qaida, of arms and related material, as well as assistance and training related to military activities.

The second action, imposes a duty upon all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, including the duty to prevent that economic resources are made available for the benefit of these groups. Since IS and ANF have control over a number of oilfields, this imposes a duty for states to refrain from engaging in energy trade with them.

The third action concerning sanctions, lists the names of six individuals on the sanctions list, and encourages that each state submits a list of individuals and entities supporting IS, ANF and similar gorups.

Combining both human and financial support, as well as direct and indirect support, the broadness of the resolution’s language makes it an effective legal tool for reducing the power of IS/ANF. But only if taken seriously, and if taken seriously by all states. Recognized as the riches terrorist organization in the world, the IS has been able to survive for as long as it has, through donations both from states and from individuals with and without connections to states. The resolution prohibits both. The exact answer to where the money comes from has been controversial and it is difficult to point to publicly accessible proofs. The Iraqi Premier Minister, Nouri al-Maliki said on 17 June 2014 that “we hold Saudi Arabia responsible” for the financial and moral support given to IS. Saudi Arabia’s close ally, the USA, rejected that accusation. However, some researchers have supported al-Maliki’s claim, and pointed not only to Saudi Arabia, but also to Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates- states of which the six black listed individuals in the resolution are citizens. Another important source of funding has been oil trade, an action also prohibited under the resolution. According to a US intelligence expert, IS draws as much as $ 1 million per day in oil profit from oil well under its control, in a market where demand is high.

Despite the universal condemnation of the IS and ANF, the content of Resolution 2170 clearly indicates that a number of states and individuals have been directly or indirectly cooperating with them. Clearly, someone is buying their oil, providing them with arms and money, and actively sending or not preventing own nationals from joining them. The resolution can thus be read as placing responsibility on the world community for having allowed for the existence of and for having supported the IS/ANF. It is positive that the Security Council now has used international law to point to the responsibility and duty of all states , but it is regrettable that it has to come after a heavy human cost.

World Refugee Day Draws Attention to Shortcomings of International Law

SyrianRefugeesintheRegionJune1st2014-page-001Tomorrow, on June 20, we observe World Refugee Day. This day was established by the United Nations to honor the courage, strength and determination of those who are forced to flee their homes under threat of persecution, conflict and violence. But this year’s World Refugee Day also reminds us – perhaps more than ever before – of our failures as an international community and the shortcomings of international refugee law. Civil war in Syria has created the worst refugee crisis in 20 years, with an average of 6,000 people fleeing every day in 2013. Not since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda have refugee numbers risen at such a startling rate.

In March of last year, the UN High Commissioner Antonio Guterres wrote in the New York Times, “[o]n Wednesday, my colleagues will register the one millionth Syrian refugee. A milestone in human tragedy. And a figure that should, after two years of death and destruction, stir the level of political action needed to put an end to this war before more lives are lost, more people forced to flee and the conflict destabilizes the region.” This past April, UNHCR once again brought to our attention the one millionth refugee, although, this time, the figure referred solely to the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In total, and in addition to 6.5 million internally displaced persons in Syria, we are currently facing a staggering 2.8 million Syrian refugees. Continue reading

Starvation in Syria: Is it time to reconsider humanitarian corridors?

Photo credit: MSGT Robert Hargreaves Jr., USAF

Photo credit: MSGT Robert Hargreaves Jr., USAF

 

Hostilities in Syria have displaced millions and killed hundreds of thousands. Every day, people die because they lack goods and services essential for their survival. Much of the suffering is a consequence of the violence of the past three years, but the failure of aid efforts to relieve the attendant humanitarian crisis has undoubtedly contributed. With the suffering showing no signs of abating, and the violence expected to escalate in the coming days in response to the presidential elections, there is a case for reconsidering how aid operations are being carried out in Syria. In particular, it seems time to reconsider the use of humanitarian corridors, arguably the most controversial – yet potentially most effective – of all assistance models. Whilst reserving judgement on the question of whether corridors could work as a universal response to crises, it certainly seems reasonable to say that the scale and severity of suffering in Syria renders them viable in the present one.

Humanitarian corridors are strips of land, sea or air that are demilitarised to allow aid convoys safe and rapid entry into particular areas of a conflict zone (often besieged cities with large civilian populations). Pursuant to negotiations on geographic and temporal requirements, corridors are established in a certain location for a certain length of time and are then suspended. Some reopen regularly in the same place; others never open in the same place more than once.

On the face of it, it is clear why these delivery models are attractive. Properly established and protected (for example by a multi-State peacekeeping force), corridors provide a highly structured and swift way of delivering aid. Crucially in light of frequent attacks on aid workers, they also render that delivery much safer.

If humanitarian corridors are so attractive, then, why is there such resistance to their use in Syria? For one thing, historically corridors have not escaped the usual politicisation and corruption rife in conflicts. In the 2009 Gaza War, for example, aid delivered through corridors was misappropriated and sold to merchants affiliated with Hamas, a militant and political organisation that governs the Gaza Strip. Corridors are not alone in that regard. Most aid mechanisms, whether organised through major international organisations such as the United Nations or through local non-governmental organisation networks, suffer the same fate.

There is also a series of unanswered legal questions that undermines the establishment of corridors. We know, for example, that corridors are most effective when they are established with the consent of the respective parties.In fact, several international law instruments require that humanitarian relief only be delivered with the consent of the receiving State.[i] But we do not know, legally speaking at least, whether there are circumstances under which corridors can be established in the absence of that consent. Indeed, such establishment may constitute unlawful interference with the internal affairs of the receiving State, thus rendering any assisting States internationally responsible and, of particular concern, establishment without consent by assisting organisations may render the organisations and their personnel subject to prosecution under domestic law. In the absence of answers to these and other important questions, and in lacking the vital legal understandings that would flow therefrom, it is unsurprising that such resistance exists.

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Long Road to Recognition for Egypt’s Nubians

Egypt has long  denied the existence of any minorities, despite being home to both ethnic and religious minorities. Nubians and other groups, such as Amazigh, have long been marginalized and suffered from exclusion and oppression. The 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the fall of President Mubarak ignited demands for the Egyptian government to recognize minority rights, and provided a unique opportunity for Egypt’s Nubian community to mobilize. While the 2012 Constitution proved to be a setback, the 2014 Constitution is the first legal instrument in Egypt to explicitly acknowledge minority rights. For Egypt’s Nubian community, it represents an important milestone.

Nubians have inhabited villages along the banks of the Nile for thousands of years. Here, they retained their own distinct language, customs and culture. Following the Condominium Agreement of 1899, which solidified the boundary between Egypt and Sudan, this group was arbitrarily divided between the two countries. Approximately half of the Nubians were forced under direct Egyptian rule. The industrialization of Egypt during the early 20th century, when a series of dams were built by the British colonial powers along the Nile, effectively uprooted the Nubian population. In the 1950s, President Nasser initiated the Aswan High Dam project, which virtually flooded all of Old Nubia, today found under Lake Nasser. In 1963, Egyptian authorities began a program of forced resettlement of approximately 50,000 Nubians from some 45 villages to new, purpose-built communities in southern Egypt. Little care was taken to safeguard the culture and traditions of the Nubian people, housing soon proved inadequate, and schools taught exclusively in Arabic. Dissatisfied with their new living conditions, a large proportion migrated to other parts of Egypt. Continue reading

The Jerusalem Arbitration Center: “Merchants of Peace” in the Middle East

On 18 November 2013, a momentous event in the history of international commercial arbitration took place: a first-of-its-kind arbitration institution designed to resolve commercial disputes between Israeli and Palestinian businesses was launched in East Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem Arbitration Center (“JAC”) is a private initiative supported by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and its renowned International Court of Arbitration, and led by the Israeli and Palestinian ICC National Committees. It is intended to increase trade and investment across this troubled border and strengthen economic integration in the region by providing neutral, efficient, and effective dispute resolution services to Israeli and Palestinians businesses. (See Catherine Rogers’ prior IntLawGrrls post on the JAC here.)

The JAC has adopted the tried and true ICC arbitration model, adjusting it to local conditions. The JAC Rules resemble the ICC Rules in many respects, including the method for nominating and appointing arbitrators, the use of Terms of References, and the scrutiny of arbitral awards by the JAC Court. The Rules were adapted, however, to reflect regional particularities and the type of disputes the JAC is expected to administer. For instance, the fees and expenses associated with JAC arbitrations were significantly reduced from those of the ICC, and the default seat of arbitration was fixed as a ‘virtual’ Paris seat (i.e., excluding parties’ ability to apply to the French courts to set aside arbitral awards, in accordance with Article 1522 of the French Code of Civil Procedure), unless the parties agree otherwise.

Moreover, in addition to adopting the jurisdictional threshold familiar from ICC practice, which requires that a JAC arbitration agreement exist prima facie, the JAC Court must also confirm three additional jurisdictional requirements under the JAC Rules before a case can be admitted. First, the amount in dispute as stated in the Request for Arbitration must not exceed $7 million; second, the dispute must be a business dispute; and third, the dispute must relate to Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. In the event that the JAC Court finds that one or more of these conditions is not met, the dispute will be transferred to the ICC Court and be administered in accordance with the latter’s Rules of Arbitration, unless the claimant withdraws its claims or the parties agree otherwise. In special circumstances, the JAC Court may seek the approval of the ICC Court to administer a case even if one of the above conditions is not met.

To ensure neutrality, professionalism, and international presence and support, the JAC Court is comprised of nine arbitration experts, with an international President (Mr. Yves Derains), an international Vice-President (Mr. Eduardo Silva Romero), two Court Members appointed by each of ICC Israel and ICC Palestine, and three international Court Members. The Secretariat is headed by an international Secretary General (Ms. Nadia Darwazeh) and includes an Israeli and a Palestinian Deputy Secretary Generals.

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