Read On! New Book on Public Law of Gender

I am delighted to contribute my first post to this excellent website to let readers know of the final book in a six volume series, Connecting International Law with Public Law, which I initiated as part of my former position as Director of the Centre for International and Public law at the ANU (2006-2015).  The first five volumes looks at themes including Sanctions, Access to Medicines, Environmental Discourses, Allegiance and Identity, and Security Institutions and have been published through Cambridge University Press.

The final volume has just been launched and it is of particular interest to the IntLawGrrls community.

I have co-edited this final volume with my friend and former ANU colleague Dr. Katharine Young, who is now at Boston University, and it is called The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global. The volume brings together leading lawyers, political scientists, historians and philosophers.

The book examines the worldwide sweep of gender-neutral, gender-equal or gender-sensitive public laws in international treaties, national constitutions and statutes, and documents the raft of legal reform and critically analyses its effectiveness. In demarcating the academic study of the public law of gender, the book examines law’s structuring of politics, governing and gender in a new global frame.

Of interest to constitutional and statutory designers, advocates, adjudicators and scholars, the contributions explore how concepts such as equality, accountability, representation, participation and rights, depend on, challenge or enlist gendered roles and/or categories. These enquiries suggest that the new public law of gender must confront the lapses in enforcement, sincerity and coverage that are common in both national and international law and governance, and critically and pluralistically recast the public/private distinction in family, community, religion, customary and market domains.  The book outlines the common and distinct challenges and issues across various fields and it provides those working with gender-sensitive laws and gender-neutral laws with an assessment of the various ways in which public law interacts with gender, by intent or outcome. It also uncovers the local and global perspectives and the obstacles facing gender equality, equity and parity, showing how traditional agendas of feminist theory now translate in a global legal frame.

I would encourage any one interested in reviewing the volume (or any of the set of six, or indeed the whole set!) for a journal to contact Elizabeth Spicer at Cambridge University Press- espicer [at] cambridge.org.

Professor Kim Rubenstein, ANU College of Law, Public Policy Fellow, Australian National University

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Dean Rusk and the dissent channel

March 18, 1967. Afternoon. Secretary of State Dean Rusk conducts a briefing on Vietnam for state governors in the Fish Room of the White House.

At White House, with President Lyndon B. Johnson in attendance, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk briefs US governors on the US-Vietnam War. The briefing took place March 18, 1967, not long before Rusk set up a “dissent channel” for State Department diplomats frustrated by US foreign policy. (photo credit)

 

In my current role as leader of the 38-year-old Dean Rusk International Law Center at the University of Georgia School of Law, I tend to take a close look at any reference to our Center’s namesake, Dean Rusk, who served as the only Secretary of State to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

And so it is with the US diplomatic topic du mois, the “dissent channel” at the Department of State.

This channel is much in the news these days, on account of a Page 1 New York Times story leaking a dissent-channel letter by 51 diplomats at State who want more use of force in Syria than President Barack Obama to date has authorized. (Worth-reading questions about the “leak” here.) And then there was yesterday’s Times story by Ellen Barry, about a dissent-channel “Blood Letter” that forestalled career advancement for the eponymous letter-writing diplomat.

Quite a surprise, amid all this, to read this explanation of the dissent channel, in a transcript of the June 17 Daily Press Briefing by a State Department spokesperson:

“This procedure, this vehicle has been in place since Secretary of State Dean Rusk was in office in 1971.”

Why a surprise? Because by 1971, Rusk was regaling Georgia Law students as the revered Sibley Professor of International Law.

At the briefing, an unnamed reporter took immediate issue with the spokesperson’s account:

QUESTION: And just – can we be clear about when it actually began? Because Rusk, I think, was gone by ’69 when the Nixon Administration came in. So I don’t think he was Secretary of State in 1971, but I could certainly be mistaken.

[ANSWER]: I think it was 1971 and —

QUESTION: Okay.

[ANSWER]: — my reading of the history said that Rusk had something to do with it. But I’m not going to quibble with you —

QUESTION: No, no.

[ANSWER]: — over the history of the program.

Uncharacteristic of these kind of transcripts, the spokesperson’s assertion is supported by a footnote [1]. It says only “William P. Rogers.” That’s the name of the man who became Secretary of State in 1969, after Rusk left government service for the last time. But a quick look at Rusk’s bio on the Department’s site would have confirmed the premise of the reporter’s question.

So what’s right, and wrong?

On the small point of timing, the spokesperson is wrong. But on the larger point of establishing a channel for dissent, unique among the world’s diplomatic services, the account is spot on. To quote a memorial published the year that Rusk died, in the Department’s own publication, Dispatch:

Dean Rusk left his mark not only on the nation and the world, but also on the Department of State as an institution. At a time of tremendous domestic social change, he encouraged minorities and women to enter the Foreign Service. He established the Dissent Channel and the Open Forum to give members of the Department alternative ways to make their foreign policy views known.

 

(Cross-posted from our Center’s Exchange of Notes blog)

ABILA Call for Proposals: International Law Weekend 2016

International Law Weekend 2016 (ILW 2016) – the premier international law event of the fall season – is scheduled for October 27-29, 2016 in New York City. The conference will be held at the New York City Bar Association (42 West 44th Street) on October 27, 2016 and at Fordham Law School (150 West 62nd Street) on October 28-29, 2016.

ILW 2016 is sponsored and organized by the  American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA) – which welcomes new members from academia, the practicing bar, and the diplomatic world – and the International Law Students Association  (ILSA). This annual conference attracts an audience of more than one thousand academics, practitioners, diplomats, members of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and law students.

The unifying theme for ILW 2016 is International Law 5.0.

The world is changing at an accelerating rate. From technological advances to environmental transformations, international lawyers are forced to confront emerging forces and new scenarios. Even settled principles of law are no longer settled. These tectonic shifts have been felt throughout the geography of international law. Legal professionals at every level – local, national, regional, and international – must change their practice to meet a changing world. Innovation will become necessary for survival.

ILW 2016 will explore these issues through a diverse collection of engaging and provocative panels.

We expect the audience to include practitioners, academics, U.N. diplomats, business leaders, federal and state government officials, NGO leaders, journalists, students, and interested citizens. We plan to have a broad array of both public international law and private international law topics in each program time slot.

The ILW Organizing Committee invites proposals to be submitted online by April 9, 2016. Panels will only be accepted through the online ILW Panel Proposal Submission Form, which is located here:

https://www.ilsa.org/index.php?option=com_chronoforms&chronoform=ILW_Panel_Proposals

Deadline: April 9, 2016

When submitting your proposal, please consider the following points.

 

  • Panel proposals may concern any aspect of contemporary international law and practice including, but not limited to, international arbitration, international environmental law, national security, cyber law, use of force, human rights, international humanitarian law, international organizations, international criminal law, international intellectual property, the law of the sea and outer space, and trade law. When submitting your proposal, please identify the primary area(s) of international law that your proposed panel will address.
  • Provide the names, titles, and affiliations of the chair and likely speakers. One of the objectives of ILW 2016 is to promote dialogue among scholars and practitioners. Panels should include presenters with diverse experiences and perspectives.
  • Please identify what format you are proposing for your panel. We welcome various formats, such as debates, roundtables, lectures, and break-out groups, as well as the usual practice of panel presentations.
  • Please indicate whether you are an ABILA member and whether or not your panel is sponsored by an ABILA committee.
  • We encourage you to consider taking the necessary steps to qualify your panel for CLE credit. We hope to offer several CLE panels.

 

For questions regarding ILW 2016, please contact conferences@ilsa.org.

 

ILW 2016 Program Committee Members:

 

William Aceves (co-chair)

Peter Yu (co-chair)

Samuel Baumgartner

Carlos Fuentes

Rahim Moloo

Jessica Simonoff

David Stewart

Tessa Walker

The Prosecution of Sexual Violence against Men in International Criminal Law

International criminal law has been vital in fostering the understanding of sexual violence against women in armed conflict as a weapon of war that targets a woman’s role in society. In particular, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been crucial in establishing that the rape of women can constitute a war crime, a violation of the laws and customs of war, and a crime against humanity. While numerous women were in fact sexually abused during the Yugoslav Wars, men also became victims of sexual violence in detention camps and police stations. Yet, their victimization has gone largely unacknowledged.

The examination of the definition of rape used by the ICTY reveals a major impediment for the full visibility of male victimhood through sexual violence. One of the most frequent forms of sexual violence against men in armed in conflict, two men being forced to sexually penetrate each other, does not fit into the ICTY definition of rape. This shortcoming should be addressed and corrected in the future by the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that definitions of crimes of a sexual nature are truly gender inclusive.

Literally, the ICTY definition of rape is formulated in a gender-neutral manner. For an act to constitute rape, it has to involve the sexual penetration of the vagina, the anus or the mouth of the victim by the penis or another object used by the perpetrator. In the context of sexual violence against men, it is usually not the element of sexual penetration that impedes the categorization of the experiences of male victims of sexual violence as rape. Rather, it is the lack of the physical involvement of the perpetrator in the act that is in conflict with the ICTY definition of the offence.

In the ten cases featuring sexual violence against men that were prosecuted at the ICTY (Tadić, Mucić et al., Todorović, Sikirica et al. and Mejakić et al., Stakić, Simić et al., Česić, Brđanin, Krajišnik, and Martić), the perpetrators did not themselves physically assault other men but rather forced male detainees to perform sexual acts on each other (Sandesh Sivakumaran coined the term ‘enforced rape’ to describe this form of sexual abuse). In eight out of ten cases, evidence was heard that male detainees were forced to perform fellatio on each other. Unquestionably, acts of fellatio involve sexual penetration of the mouth. However, as the perpetrator was in those cases not physically involved, those scenarios did not meet the ICTY definition of rape. Only in Simić et al. (Prosecutor v. Simić et al. Trial Judgement, IT-95-9-T, 17 October 2003, § 728) and Sikirica et al. (Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al. Indictment (Second Amended), IT-95-8-PT, 3 January 2001, § 46), where objects were forced into the anus of a detainee, would the sexual assault have been within the scope of the definition of rape. Continue reading

Casas de la Memoria to Conviction?

From “casas de la memoria” in Guatemala, Peru, and El Salvador to an upcoming international colloquium in Spain entitled “From Past to Future: Memory and the Process of Transition,” the development of collective memory – an enduring and shared memory of events – is taking center stage as one path toward healing the wounds of a tattered national conscience and preventing the recurrence of mass atrocities. But to what extent is collective memory compatible with judicial systems, which tend to be very individual-centered?

An annual online symposium co-hosted by Opinio Juris and NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP) that went live this morning is exploring this very question. The focus of the symposium is The (Re)collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for Transnational Justice, my article that was recently published in Volume 47, Number 4, of NYU JILP.

The impetus for this article arises from the challenges I encountered in working with survivors of mass atrocity. The indivisibility of their memory struck me, as did the healing and bonds it generated. As I began to examine the literature on collective memory, I realized that I was not alone in this observation. Scholars from disciplines ranging from sociology to clinical psychology have written about and documented collective memory and its cathartic effects.

My article explores the tension between the preservation of collective memory and another impulse that follows mass atrocity: the desire for justice. Because many judicial systems are heavily influenced by notions of individualism, they are by design ill equipped to accommodate collective memory. Traditional rules of evidence and professional conduct often exhibit a single-minded focus on individual representation by replicating models that assume one client who autonomously makes legal decisions without consulting his or her community. Bound by these rules, attorneys must disrupt or even dismantle collective memory, thereby retraumatizing their clients.

In this article, I offer an alternative. I believe that human rights attorneys should instead endeavor to preserve and promote collective memory. For that reason, I urge a fundamental rethinking of the law’s preference for individual memory in the context of transitional justice. I believe that the inclusion of collective memory would better serve the goals of transitional justice by facilitating a more complete understanding of the collective harms of mass atrocity and possibly advancing reconciliation.

Today and tomorrow, Opinio Juris will feature comments on my article from four distinguished scholars:

Mark A. Drumbl is the Class of 1975 Alumni Professor of Law and Director of the Transnational Law Institute at Washington & Lee University.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza is Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law (and a fellow IntLawGrrl!Ed.).
Ruti Teitel is Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law at New York Law School.
Johan D. van der Vyver is the I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Emory University School of Law.

Tomorrow, I will respond to their comments. I welcome you to join the conversation by posting your thoughts here.

Trade & Development, Part II

I’m usually skeptical of explanations for continued poverty in the developing world that point to the history of colonialism. Note, I’m not talking about the continued gap in economic development between developed and developing countries. I’m talking about the existence of deep pockets of extreme poverty after decades of political independence.

As we discussed in our recent post, Trade & Development, one pervasive, and corrosive, explanation for the poverty is corruption. Yet, I find this only a partial explanation. How is it possible to look at another human being and deny their right to the basics of life just to make more money?

In the context of Africa, one remnant of colonial rule may remain pertinent in our search for answers.

Colonial powers carved out their territories ignoring existing ethnograpical and cultural realities. The newly independent nations signed treaties in which they agreed to respect these political boundaries handed down to them. Yet, we know that the cultural memory lives on outside of these country borders.

For example: Just six years after political independence, the Muslim Hausas in northern Nigeria seceded and created the Republic of Biafra. A bloody civil war ended with the surrender to Nigeria by Biafra. Fifty years later the separatist movement continues. The religious and cultural tensions which led to the creation of Bangladesh (predominantly Bengali-speaking Muslim), Pakistan (Muslim) and India (Hindu and Sikhs) out of what had been British India survive today in the conflict over Kashmir. In Europe, Yugoslavia’s borders did not survive the death of President Tito. After several wars, it has been replaced by seven (7) countries organized along religious and ethnic lines.

Partition of Africa

Modern-day borders by colonial legacy (royal blue - France; pink - Britain; purple - Portugal; yellow -Belgium; green - Italy; light blue - Germany). Courtesy of Wikipedia.

Modern-day borders by colonial legacy (royal blue – France; pink – Britain; purple – Portugal; yellow -Belgium; green – Italy; light blue – Germany). Courtesy of Wikipedia.

At the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the major colonial powers cut lines across the African interior that grouped together scores and dozens of ethnic groups. These lines also split up existing boundaries.

To use Angola as an example: For over 300 years prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the Bakongo (the Kongo people), had been united under the rule of the Kingdom of Kongo, one of the most important civilizations to emerge in Africa. Today, these several million people live in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Angola. From the time of its founding by Ne Lukeni Kia Nzinga until its destruction in 1665 by the Portuguese, the Kingdom of Kongo existed as an organized, stable, politically centralized society. Left alone, this Kingdom might well have evolved intrinsically into a modern-day state. This process was interrupted by the partition of its territory among the European colonial powers.

Modern Consequences

Angola’s population today is divided ethnically into three main groups – the Ovimbundu (37% of the population), the Mbundu (25%), and the Bakongo (13%). The remaining 25% include scores of other ethnic groups, both large and small.

The decades-long war fought by Angola for political independence from Portugal reflected these ethnic lines within the country. Three liberation groups simultaneously fought the Portuguese and each other. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) is predominantly Mbundu (what used to be the Ndongo Kingdom). União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) is predominantly Ovimbundu (Bailundo Kingdom). Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) is predominantly Bakongo (Kingdom of Kongo).

The winners were the MPLA, which has ruled Angola since its political independence. Over time, writes Assis Malaquias in Ethnicity and Conflict in Angola: Prospects for Reconciliation, the additional factors present in the liberation struggle – class and ideology — have diminished, leaving intact the ethnic divide. Effectively, the MPLA rules Angola in the interests of the Mbundu people, comprising at best about one-quarter of the population. The resources of the state have become “the property” of the Mbundu, rather than of the citizens of Angola.

In Angola and much of Africa, the arbitrary colonial divisions have “politicized” ethnicity (Assis Malaquias).

As long as this reality remains essentially ignored by the West, the search for solutions to end the corruption that diverts a country’s resources into the hands of a few, and the poverty this practice creates, is likely to remain elusive.

Secrecy in international agreements

The recent P5+1 negotiations and the agreements reached so far have sparked much discussion and letter-writing. Part of this has to do with the obscurity of the negotiations and the simple reason that the few texts that have been made public are unlikely to present the totality of what the negotiations actually deal with apart from the nuclear issue. What is the deal with secrecy in international agreements?

The first reference in English to the Sykes-Picot agreement, by The Manchester Guardian 26 November 1917

The first reference in English to the Sykes-Picot agreement, by The Manchester Guardian 26 November 1917

Few things happen without a reason. Sometimes, what seems to be the apparent reason is only a piece, sometimes not even the right one, of a bigger picture. This includes international relations and the way in which they influence national, regional, and international developments. Part of what makes it difficult to dissect these developments, from the outside, is the use of secret agreements in international relations. Since they are secret, sometimes modestly referred to as “confidential”, such documents are released only after 20 years, 30 years, 50 years or whatever the confidentiality norm is in a country. Before World War I, the use of secret agreements or treaties, was quite common, typically dealing with alliances during war  and division of spheres of influence. The Treaty of Dover, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Quadripartite Agreement and the Hoare-Laval Pact are only some of the many significant secret agreements of the past with major geopolitical impacts that have shaped our common history. While there can be good reasons for keeping certain agreements secret, secret international agreements are at the same time problematic from the perspective of sovereignty, democracy, rule of law, and an open society. They are also prohibited under international law.

Secret treaties under international law
At the Treaty of Versailles, marking an end to World War I, Woodrow Wilson proposed to include a prohibition against secret treaties by proposing that that all treaties should be made through the League of Nations. This proposal did not make it to the Treaty of Versailles, but was subsequently included in Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided that “every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.” The new rule had become, in other words, publicness of international agreements, through a requirement of registration. This did not, to nobody’s surprise, end the use of secret agreements in practice, but for the first time such agreements were prohibited on a formal level.
The UN Charter continues this policy in chapter XVI. Article 102 provides that:
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations. “
Article 103 establishes the UN Charter as the superior law by stating that the obligations under the charter prevail in case of conflict the obligations under another international agreement.

The continued use of secret international agreements
Despite the clear prohibition under international law, secret international agreements continue in practice. For example, The United Kingdom- United States of America Agreement (UKUSA) between the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,and with several third parties subsequently joining, was entered into in 1946, but was not disclosed to the public until 2005 and its full text was not made public until 2010.
Because they are secret, contemporary secret agreements are hard to identify and such identifications often become mere speculations, giving rise to a variety of juicy conspiracy theories. However, sometimes such agreements are fairly easy to identify through a two-step process. The first is that there is knowledge that an agreement has been entered into. Second, the content of the agreement has not been made public. In such a case it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that the agreement is secret.

A recent example of such a case is the P5+1 agreement with Iran. There is knowledge about an agreement, yet its content has not been made public. It has been referred to as the “Nuclear Agreement”, obviously dealing with some aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, and indeed some of the obligations with respect to the nuclear issue have been referred to by the parties and an interim agreement has been published. Yet considering the geopolitical context of the agreement as well as the parties to it, it is highly probable that the P5+1 negotiations deals with broader issues than the nuclear issue. But we cannot know whether the terms of the agreement are in accordance with international law because the text has not been made public.

The context for the agreement- the location, the parties, the interests- bears resemblance to that of an agreement entered into almost a century ago, also that one a secret one. Whether or not the P5+1 agreement is the 21st century version of Sykes-Picot is impossible to know, because the content of the text, like that of Sykes-Picot (which became public in 1917, after the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia), has not been made public. Would it make a difference? That is the central problem of secret agreements. It is impossible to know since they are secret.