On November 17, Serbs in the northern Kosovar city of Mitrovica cast their ballots under tight security. They are seeking to elect a mayor for the northern part of the city (presumably a Serb), whereas the southern portion of the city, under Kosovar Albanian control, will elect a counter-part (presumably Kosovar Albanian) mayor. The vote is a redo from a failed November 3 election, when masked gunmen interrupted the voting process. By most accounts, the gunmen were sent by hardline Serbs, seeking to thwart the de facto secession process of Kosovo from Serbia. Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and the International Court of Justice refused to pronounce this type of declaration illegal, thereby implicitly confirming the legality of the separation process. The Serbian government has for years refused to acknowledge the loss of Kosovo, and has until recently continued to lay territorial claims on this southern region. Serbia however has had to renounce this claim, because its accession procedure to the European Union has been conditioned upon letting go of Kosovo. For hardline Serbs living in Mitrovica this idea might seem unimaginable. Thus, voter turn-out at yesterday’s elections was low – only 22 per cent of the Serbs showed up to the polls. The low voter turn-out most likely reflects a lack of confidence by Serbian voters in an integrated Kosovar state. The situation on the ground, in Mitrovica and in other parts of Kosovo where Serbs may still be found, confirms this state of affairs – the Serbian and the Albanian populations seem to be co-existing under total segregation, with occasional outbursts of violence.
The European Union authorities have been pressuring Serbia to accept a deal which would normalize Serb-Albanian relations by encouraging the Serbian government to entice Serbs living in Kosovo to participate in democratic elections in Kosovo, thereby accepting a majority Kosovar-Albanian government over the entire region. Under this deal, Serbs in Kosovo could potentially elect Serbian local majors and township leaders, and could send their representatives to the Kosovar parliament. Under this deal, however, Serbia and Serbs living in Kosovo would have to renounce any desire for a separation of northern Kosovo and its reunification with Serbia, and would have to accept political participation in a majority-led Kosovar Albanian state. Much scholarship so far has focused on the issue of the Kosovar declaration of independence, and on issues of statehood and secession, but relatively little has ben written on the issue of de facto states – entities which exist de facto separately, but which de jure belong to a larger mother state, which for political, military, or other reasons does not exercise effective control over such an entity. Examples of de facto states include Republika Srpska (existing de facto separately from the Bosnian Federation), Taiwan, Nagorno-Karabakh (existing de facto separately from Azerbaijan), Northern Cyprus, Palestine, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (the latter two existing de facto separately from Georgia). Will northern Kosovo turn into a de facto state, an entity which legally belongs to the larger state of Kosovo, but which for complex reasons cannot be truly integrated into Kosovo and continues to function distinctly, as its own “selfistan”?
When Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, the issue of minority Serbs living in Kosovo was left untouched. The expectation may have been that they would move away to Serbia (for many Kosovar Serbs, this option was not available because of a lack of housing, educational or professional opportunities away from their homeland in Kosovo), or that they would accept a majority Albanian rule and participate democratically in this newly created state. Because of deep animosity existing for decades, if not centuries, between the Serbian and the Albanian communities in Kosovo, the latter should not have seemed as a plausible solution – without some exceptional accommodations and assurances. The last mayor election in Mitrovica may represent such an attempt to entice local Serbs to participate in Kosovar political life, by allowing them to elect a Serbian mayor for the northern, Serb-dominated part of town. While this solution appears politically sound, it further deepens the rift existing between the Serbian and the Albanian communities and it further promotes the de facto segregation within Kosovo. This is what essentially took place in Bosnia, where Serbs congregated to the eastern part of the country and formed their own de facto state, Republika Srpska. This is equally what took place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which now function de facto separately from the official Georgian government, and this has been the state of affairs in Cyprus, where the northern part has operated as a de facto separate entity, led by Turkish Cypriots, for several decades. The Taiwanese and the Palestinians have formed their own almost-states, and Nagorno-Karabakh, although it officially belongs to Azerbaijan, has very little to do with the Azeri government. This state of affairs is far from ideal for the de facto states and their populations. Because they lack the official label of statehood, these entities are not able to participate in international affairs, lack membership in the United Nations and other most important international organizations, and cannot attract advantageous international investments. Thus, they remain (except perhaps Taiwan) isolated, under-developed, poor, and prone to further violence. They may also become puppets in the hands of more powerful states, which may use them to gain political advantage and which may, because of complex geo-political reasons, forever deny them statehood.
Only time will tell how the situation in Kosovo will develop. As of now, the state of Kosovo remains dependent on the international community for the safekeeping of its borders, its ethnic balance, its politics, and its development. If Kosovar Serbs accept this state of affairs, they may attempt to broker a deal for themselves – a sort of provincial autonomy within the larger Kosovar state. If they do not and if they keep refusing to participate in the life of the new state of Kosovo, they may become a de facto state, hoping that some day they could be allowed to rejoin Serbia. The European Union authorities have as of now convinced the Serbian government in Belgrade to support a single Kosovar state, but it appears that Serbs in Kosovo remain unconvinced that their future should lie within such a single, Albanian-dominated state. As of now, meaningful integration between the two communities seems impossible, and at best, we can all hope for the preservation of peace and stability.